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EX LIBRIS JAS. K. MC CONICA
v/
EVERYMAN'S LIBRARY EDITED BY ERNEST RHYS
ESSAYS AND BELLES LETTRES
MACHIAVELLI'S PRINCE
TRANSLATED WITH INTRODUCTION
^BY W. K. MARRIOTT, F. R. Hist. S.
THIS IS NO. 280 OF eFe%r3i[^v<^s
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BIOGRAPHY
REFERENCE
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LIBRARY EDITION IN REINFORCED CLOTH
London: J. M. DENT k SONS Ltd. New York: E. P. DUTTON & CO.
THE PRINCE By NICOLO MACHIAVELU f^^ Translated by WKMarriott
"FRHisLS- t:^^<S)
LONDON &.TORONTO PUBUSHED BYJ M DENT &.SONS DP&IN NEWYORK BYE P DUTTON &. CO
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INTRODUCTION
NicoLO Machiavelli was bom at Florence on May 3, 1469. He was the second son of Bernardo di Nicolo Machiavelli, a lawyer of some repute, and of Bartolommea di Stefano Nelli, his wife. Both parents were members of the old Florentine nobility.
His hfe falls naturally into three periods, each of which singularly enough constitutes a distinct and important era in the history of Florence. His youth was concurrent with the greatness of Florence as an Italian power under the guidance of Lorenzo de' Medici, II Magnifico. The downfall of the Medici in Florence occurred in 1494, in which year Machiavelli entered the pubUc service. During his ofl&cial career Florence was free under the government of a Repubhc, which lasted until 1512, when the Medici returned to power, and Machiavelli lost his office. The Medici again ruled Florence from 1512 until 1527, when they were once more driven out. This was the period of Machia- veUi's literary activity and increasing influence;
vii
viii Introduction
but he died, within a few weeks of the expulsion of the Medici, on June 22. 1527, in his fifty- eighth year, without having regained office.
YOUTH
^T. 1-25— I469-I494
Although there is little recorded of the youth of Machiavelli, the Florence of those days is so well known that the early environment of this representative citizen may be easily imagined, Florence has been described as a city with two opposite currents of Ufe, one directed by the fervent and austere Savonarola, the other by the splendour-loving Lorenzo. Savonarola's in- fluence upon the young Machiavelli must have been slight, for although at one time he wielded immense power over the fortunes of Florence, he only furnished Machiavelli with a subject for a gibe in The Prince, where he is cited as an example of an unarmed prophet who came to a bad end. Whereas the magnificence of the Medicean rule during the fife of Lorenzo appears to have impressed MachiaveUi strongly, for he frequently recurs to it in his writings, and it is to Lorenzo's grandson that he dedicates The Prince,
Introduction ix
MachiaveUi, in his " History of Florence," gives us a picture of the young men among whom his youth was passed. He writes: — " They were freer than their forefathers in dress and living, and spent more in other kinds of excesses, consuming their time and money in idleness, gaming, and women; their chief aim was to appear well dressed and to speak with wit and acuteness, whilst he who could wound others the most cleverly was thought the wisest." In a letter to his son Guido, MachiaveUi shows why youth should avail itself of its opportunities for study, and leads us to infer that his own youth had been so occupied. He writes: — " I have received your letter, which has given me the greatest pleasure, especially because you tell me you are quite restored to health, than which I could have no better news; for if God grant life to you, and to me, I hope to make a good man of you if you are willing to do your share." Then, writing of a new patron, he continues: — " Tnis will turn out well for you, but it is necessary for you to study ; since, then, you have no longer the excuse of illness, take pains to study letters and music, for you see what honour is done to me for the httle skill I have. Therefore, my son, if you 'msh to please me, and to bring success and honour to yourself, do right and study, because others wUl help you if you help yourself."
X Introduction
OFFICE
^T. 25-43— 1494-15 12
The second period of Machiavelli's life was spent in the service of the free Republic of Flor- ence, which flourished, as stated above, from the expulsion of the Medici in 1494 until their return in 1512. After serving four years in one of the public ofi&ces he was appointed Chancellor and Secretary to the Second Chancery, the Ten of Liberty and Peace. Here we are on firm ground when dealing with the events of Machiavelli's life, for during this time he took a leading part in the affairs of the Republic, and we have its decrees, records, and despatches to guide us, as well as his own writings. A mere recapitulation of a few of his transactions with the statesmen and soldiers of his time gives a fair indication of his activities, and supphes the sources from which he drew the experiences and characters which illustrate The Prince.
His first mission was in 1499 to Caterina Sforza, the Madonna di Forh of The Prince, from whose conduct and fate he drew the moral that it is far better to earn the confidence of the people than to rely on fortresses. This is a very notice- able principle in Machiavelli, and is urged by
Introduction xi
him in many ways as a matter of vital import- ance to princes.
In 1500 he was sent to France to obtain terms from Louis XII. for continuing the war against Pisa: this king it was who, in his conduct of affairs in Italy, committed the five capital errors in statecraft summarised in The Prince, and was consequently driven out. He, also, it was who made the dissolution of his marriage a condition of support to Pope Alexander VI. ; which leads MachiaveUi to refer those who urge that such promises should be kept to what he has written concerning the faith of princes.
Machiavelli's public life was largely occupied with events arising out of the ambitions of Pope Alexander VI. and his son, Cesare Borgia, the Duke Valentino; and these characters fiU a large space of The Prince. MachiaveUi never hesitates to cite the actions of the duke for the benefit of usurpers who wish to keep the states they have seized ; he can, indeed, find no pre- cepts to offer so good as the pattern of Cesare Borgia's conduct, insomuch that Cesare is ac- claimed by some critics as the " hero " of The Prince. Yet in The Prince the duke is in point of fact cited as a type of the man who rises on the fortune of others, and falls with them ; who takes every course that might be expected from a prudent man but the course which will save him; who is prepared for all eventuahties but
xii Introduction
the one which happens; and who, when all his abilities fail to carry him through, exclaims that it was not his fault, but an extraordinary and unforeseen fatality.
On the death of Pius III., in 1503, Machia- velH was sent to Rome to watch the election of his successor, and there he saw Cesare Borgia cheated into allowing the choice of the College to fall on Giuhano delle Rovere (Julius II,), who was one of the cardinals that had most reason to fear the duke. MachiaveUi, when comment- ing on this election, says that he who thinks new favours will cause great personages to forget old injuries deceives himself. JuHus did not rest until he had ruined Cesare.
It was to Juhus II. that MachiaveUi was sent in 1506, when that pontiff was commencing his enterprise against Bologna ; which he brought to a successful issue, as he did many of his other adventures, owing chiefly to his impetuous character. It is in reference to Pope Juhus that MachiaveUi moralises on the resemblance between Fortune and women, and concludes that it is the bold rather than the cautious man that wiU win and hold them both.
It is impossible to foUow here the varying fortunes of the Itahan states, which in 1507 were controUed by France, Spain, and Germany, with results that have lasted to our day ; we are concerned with those events, and with the three
Introduction xiil
great actors in them, so far only as they im- pinge on the personahty of Machiavelli. He had several meetings with Louis XII. of France, and his estimate of that monarch's character has already been alluded to. Machiavelli has painted Ferdinand of Arragon as the man who accompUshed great things under the cloak of religion, but who in reality had no mercy, faith, humanity, or integrity ; and who, had he allowed himself to be influenced by such motives, would have been ruined. The Emperor Maximihan was one of the most interesting men of the age, and his character has been drawn by many hands; but MachiaveUi, who was an envoy at his court in 1507-8, reveals the secret of his many failures when he describes him as a secretive man, without force of character — ignoring the human agencies necessary to carry his schemes into effect, and never insisting on the fulfilment of his wishes.
The remaining years of Machiavelli's oflScial career were filled with events arising out of the League of Cambray, made in 1508 between the three great European powers already mentioned and the Pope, with the object of crushing the Venetian Republic. This result was attained at the battle of Vaila, when Venice lost in one day all that she had won in eight hundred years, Florence had a difficult part to play during these events, comphcated as they were by the feud
xiv Introduction
which broke out between the Pope and the French, because friendship with France had dictated the entire pohcy of the Repubhc. When, in 1511, JuHus II. finally formed the Holy League against France, and with the assistance of the Swiss drove the French out of Italy, Florence lay at the mercy of the Pope, and had to submit to his terms, one of which was that the Medici should be restored. The return of the Medici to Florence on September i, 1512, and the consequent fall of the Republic, was the signal for the dismissal of Machiavelli and his friends, and thus put an end to his public career, for, as we have seen, he died without regaining office.
LITERATURE AND DEATH
^T. 43-58— 1512-1527
On the return of the Medici, MachiaveHi, who for a few weeks had vainly hoped to retain his office under the new masters of Florence, was dismissed by decree dated November 7, 1512. Shortly after this he was accused of complicity in an abortive conspiracy against the Medici, imprisoned, and put to the question by torture. The new Medicean Pope, Leo X., procured his
Introduction xv
release, and he retired to his small property at San Casciano, near Florence, where he devoted himself to literature. In a letter to Francesco Vettori, dated December 13, 1513, he has left a very interesting description of his life at this period, which elucidates his methods and his motives in writing The Prince. After describ- ing his daily occupations with his family and neighbours, he writes: — "The evening being come, I return home and go to my study; at the entrance I pull off my peasant-clothes, covered with dust and dirt, and put on my noble court dress, and thus becomingly re-clothed I pass into the ancient courts of the men of old, where, being lovingly received by them, I am fed with that food which is mine alone; where I do not hesitate to speak with them, and to ask for the reason of their actions, and they in their benignity answer me; and for four hours I feel no weariness, I forget every trouble, poverty does not dismay, death does not terrify me; I am possessed entirely by those great men. And because Dante says: —
' Knowledge doth come of learning well retained, Unfruitful else,'
I have noted down what I have gained from their conversation, and have composed a small work on ' Principalities,' where I pour myself out as fully as I can m meditation on the
xvi Introduction
subject, discussing what a principality is, what kinds there are, how they can be acquired, how they can be kept, why they are lost : and if any of my fancies ever pleased you, this ought not to displease you : and to a prince, especially to a new one, it should be welcome: therefore I dedicate it to his Magnificence Giuliano. Fihppo Casavecchio has seen it; he will be able to teU you what is in it, and of the discourses I have had with him; nevertheless, I am still enriching and polishing it."
The " little book " suffered many vicissitudes before attaining the form in which it has reached us. Various mental influences were at work during its composition; its title and patron were changed; and for some unknown reason it was finally dedicated to Lorenzo de' Medici. Although Machiavelli discussed with Casa- vecchio whether it should be sent or presented in person to the patron, there is no evidence that Lorenzo ever received or even read it: he certainly never gave MachiaveUi any employ- ment. Although it was plagiarised during Machiavelli's Ufetime, The Prince was never published by him, and its text is still disputable.
MachiavelH concludes his letter to Vettori thus:— "And as to this little thing [his book] when it has been read it will be seen that during the fifteen years I have given to the study of statecraft I have neither slept nor idled;
Introduction xvii
and men ought ever to desire to be served by one who has reaped experience at the expense of others. And of my loyalty none could doubt, because having always kept faith I could not now learn how to break it; for he who has been faithful and honest, as I have, cannot change his nature; and my poverty is a witness to my honesty."
Before Machiavelli had got The Prince off his hands he commenced his " Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius," which should be read concurrently with The Prince. These and several minor works occupied him until the year 1 518, when he accepted a small commission to look after the affairs of some Florentine mer- chants at Genoa. In 1519 the Medicean rulers of Florence granted a few poHtical concessions to her citizens, and MachiaveUi with others was consulted upon a new constitution under which the Great Council was to be restored; but on one pretext or another it was not promulgated.
In 1520 the Florentine merchants again had recourse to Machiavelli to settle their difficul- ties with Lucca, but this year was chiefly remarkable for his re-entry into Florentine Hterary society, where he was much sought after, and also for the production of his " Art of War." It was in the same year that he received a commission at the mstance of Cardinal de' Medici to write the " Historv of Florence," a
xviii Introduction
task which occupied him until 1525. His return to popular favour may have determined the Medici to give him this employment, for an old writer observes that " an able statesman out of work, hke a huge whale, will endeavour to overturn the ship unless he has an empty cask to play with."
When the " History of Florence " was finished, MachiaveUi took it to Rome for presentation to his patron, Giuhano de' Medici, who had in the meanwhile become pope under the title of Clement VIL It is somewhat remarkable that, as, in 1 5 13, MachiaveUi had written The Prince for the instruction of the Medici after they had just regained power in Florence, so, in 1525, he dedicated the " History of Florence " to the head of the family when its ruin was now at hand. In that year the battle of Pavia destroyed the French rule in Italy, and left Francis I. a prisoner in the hands of his great rival, Charles V. This was followed by the sack of Rome, upon the news of which the popular party at Florence threw off the yoke of the Medici, who were once more banished.
MachiaveUi was absent from Florence at this time, but hastened his return, hoping to secure his former office of secretary to the " Ten of Liberty and Peace." Unhappily he was taken iU soon after he reached Florence, where he died on June 22, 1527.
Introduction xix
THE MAN AND HIS WORKS
No one can say where the bones of Machia- velli rest, but modem Florence has decreed him a stately cenotaph in Santa Croce, by the side of her most famous sons; recognising that, what- ever other nations may have found in his works, Italy found in them the idea of her unity and the germs of her renaissance among the nations of Europe. Whilst it is idle to protest against the world-wide and evil signification of his name, it may be pointed out that the harsh construc- tion of his doctrine which this sinister reputa- tion implies was unknown to his own day, and that the researches of recent times have enabled us to interpret him more reasonably. It is due to these inquiries that the shape of an " unholy necromancer," which so long haunted men's vision, has begun to fade.
MachiaveUi was undoubtedly a man of great observation, acuteness, and industry; noting with appreciative eye whatever passed before him, and with his supreme literary gift turning it to account in his enforced retirement from affairs. He does not present himself, nor is he depicted by his contemporaries, as a type of that rare combination — the successful states- man and author, for he appears to have been only moderately prosperous in his several
XX Introduction
embassies and political employments. He was misled by Caterina Sforza, ignored by Louis XIL, over-awed by Cesare Borgia; several of his embassies were quite barren of results; his attempts to fortify Florence failed, and the soldiery that he raised astonished everybody by their cowardice. In the conduct of his own affairs he was timid and time serving; he dared not appear by the side of Soderini, to whom he owed so much, for fear of compromising him- self; his connection with the Medici was open to suspicion, and Giuliano appears to have re- cognised his real forte when he set him to write the " History of Florence," rather than employ him in the state. And it is on the Uterary side of his character, and there alone, that we find no weakness and no failure.
Although the hght of almost four centuries has been focussed on The Prince, its problems are still debatable and interesting, because they are the eternal problems between the ruled and their rulers. Such as they are, its ethics are those of Machiavelli's contemporaries; yet they cannot be said to be out of date so long as the governments of Europe rely on material rather than on moral forces. Its historical mcidents and personages become interesting by reason of the uses which Machiavelli makes of them to illustrate his theories of government and conduct.
Introduction xxi
Leaving out of consideration those maxims of state which still furnish some European and eastern statesmen with principles of action. The Prince is bestrewn with truths that can be proved at every turn. Men are still the dupes of their simplicity and greed, as they were in the days of Alexander VI. The cloak of religion still conceals the vices which Machiavelli laid bare in the character of Ferdinand of Arragon. Men will not look at things as they really are, but as they wish them to be — and are ruined. In politics there are no perfectly safe courses; prudence consists in choosing the least danger- ous ones. Then — to pass to a higher plane — MachiaveUi reiterates that, although crimes may win an empire, they do not win glory. Neces- sary wars are just wars, and the arms of a nation are hallowed when it has no other resource but to fight.
It is the cry of a far later day than MachiavelH's that government should be elevated into a living moral force, capable of inspiring the people with a just recognition of the fundamental prin- ciples of society; to this " high argument " The Prince contributes but Uttle. Machiavelli always refused to write either of men or of governments otherwise than as he found them, and he writes with such skill and insight that his work is of abiding value. But what invests The Prince with more than a merely artistic or
xxii Introduction
historical interest is the incontrovertible truth that it deals with the great principles which still guide nations and rulers in their relationship with each other and their neighbours.
In translating The Prince my aim has been to achieve at all costs an exact literal rendering of the original, rather than a fluent paraphrase adapted to the modem notions of style and expression. Machiavelli was no facile phrase- monger ; the conditions under which he wrote obliged him to weigh every word ; his themes are lofty, his substance grave, his manner nobly plain and serious. Quis eo fuit unquam in partiundis rebus, in definiendis, in explanandis pressior ? In The Prince, it may be truly said, there is reason assignable, not only for every word, but for the position of every word. To an Enghshman of Shakespeare's time the trans- lation of such a treatise was in some ways a comparatively easy task, for in those times the genius of the English more nearly resembled that of the Italian language; to the English- man of to-day it is not so simple. To take a single example: the word intrattenere, em- ployed by Machiavelli to indicate the policy adopted by the Roman Senate towards the weaker states of Greece, would by an Eliza- bethan be correctly rendered " entertain," and every contemporary reader would understand what was meant by saying that " Rome enter-
Introduction xxiii
iained the iEtolians and the Acheans without augmenting their power." But to-day such a phrase would seem obsolete and ambiguous, if not unmeaning: we are compelled to say that " Rome maintained friendly relations with the iEtoHans," etc., using four words to do the work of one. I have tried to preserve the pithy brevity of the Italian, so far as was consistent with an absolute fidehty to the sense. If the result be an occasional asperity I can only hope that the reader, in his eagerness to reach the author's meaning, may overlook the roughness of the road that leads him to it.
Principal Works : Discorso sopra le cose di Pisa, 1499; Del modo di trattare i popoli della Valdichiana ribellati, 1502; Del modo tenuto dal duca Valentino nell' ammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, etc., 1502; Discorso sopra la provvisione del danaro, 1502; Decennale primo (poem in terza rima), 1506; Kitratti delle cose dell' Alemagna, 1508-12; Decen- nale secondo, 1509; Ritratti delle cose di Francia, 1510; Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di T. Livio, 3 vols., 15 1 2-1 7; II Principe, 151 3; Andria, comedy trans- lated from Terence, 151 3 (?); Mandragola, prose comedy in five acts, with prologue in verse, 1 5 1 3 ; Delia Lingua (dialogue), 15 14; Clizia, comedy in prose, 1515 {?); Belfagor arcidiacolo (novel), 1515; Asino d'oro (poem in terza rima), 1517; Dell' Arte della guerra, 15 19-20; Discorso sopra il riformare lo stato di Firenze, 15 20; Sommario delle cose della citta di Lucca, 15 20; Vita di Castruccio Castracani da Lucca, 1520; Istorie Florentine, 8 books, 1521-25; Frammenti Storici, 1525.
xxiv Introduction
Other poems include Sonetti, Canzonl, Ottava, and Canti Camascialeschi.
Works: Edition, Aldo, Venice, 1546; della Tes- tina, 1550; Cambiagi, Florence, 6 vols., 1782-86; del Classici, Milaji, 10 vols., 1804-5; Molinari, Venice, 12 vols., 1811; d'ltalia, 8 vols., 1813; Silvestri, 9 vols., 1820-22; Passerini, Fanfani, Milanesi, 6 vols, only published, 1873-77.
Minor Works: Ed. F. L. Polidori, 1852; Lettere Famigliari, ed. E. Alvisi, 1883, 2 editions, one with excisions; Tredited writings, ed. G. Canestrini, 1857; Letters to F. Vettori, see A. Ridolfi, Pensieri in tomo alio scopo di N. Machiavelli nel libro, II Principe, etc.
Translation of Works: H. Nevile, 1675, 2nd ed., 1 720; E. P'ameworth, 2 vols., 1762, 1775; History of Florence, and Affairs of Italy, Prince, etc., Bohn's Standard Library, 1847; Historical, poUtical, and diplomatic writings, C. E. Detmold, 4 vols., 1882; The Prince and other pieces, Morley's Universal Library, 1883; The Prince, N. HiU Thomson, 2nd ed., Clarendon Press, 1897; L. Ricci, World's Classics, 1903; Art of War (P. Whitehome, 1560), The Prince (E. Davies, 1640), Florentine History (T. Bedingfield, 1595), Tudor Translations, 1905; Florentine History, N. Hill Thomson, 2 vols., 1906.
Lives: Nitti, 1876; P. Villari, N. Machiavelli e i suoi Tempi, 3 vols., 1877-82, 1895-97; Translation of P. Villari's work by L. Villari. 1878, 1892 (91); Tommasini, 1882; Mariano, 1886; F. Falco, 1896; V. Turri, 1902. EngUsh: J. M. Robertson (Pioneer Humanists), 1907; see also Macaulay, Critical and Historical Essays; and Greenwood, Cosmopolis, 1897.
CONTENTS
PACE
Introduction ....... vii
Dedication to The Magnificent Lorenzo di
PiERO de' Medici . . . . i
chapter
I. How MANY Kinds of Principalities there are,
AND BY w-HAT Means they are acquired . 5
II. Concerning Hereditary Principalities . . 9
III. Concerning Mixed Principauties ... 13
rV. Why the Kingdom of Darius, conquered by Alexander, did not rebel against the Successors OF Alexander AT his Death . 29
V. Concerning the way to govern Cities or Prin- cipalities which lived under their own Laws before they were annexed . . 37
VI. Concerning Principalities which are acquired
BY one's own Arms and Ability . . 43
VII. Concerning new Principalities which are ac- quired EITHER BY THE ARMS OF OTHERS OR UY
Good Fortune ..... 51
VIII. Concerning those who have obtained a Prin-
ciP.ALiTY BY Wickedness . . . .65
IX. Concerning a Civil Principality . . 75
X. Concerning the way in which the Strength of
ALL Principalities ought to be measured 83
XI. Concerning Ecclesiastical Principalities . 89
XII. How uasy Kinds of Soldiery there are, and
concerning Mercenaries • • • 95
XIII. Concerning Auxiliaries, Mixed Soldiery, and
one's own ..... 105
XTV. That which concerns a Prince on the Subject
of the Art of War .... 113
XXV
xxvi Contents
CHAPTER PAGB
XV. Concerning things for which Men, and especi- ally Princes, are praised or blamed . 119
XVI. Concerning Liberality and Meanness . . 125
XVII. Concernino Cruelty and Clemency, and
WHETHER it IS BETTER TO BE LOVED THAN
feared ....... 131
XVIII. Concerning the Way in which Princes should
keep Faith ...'... 139
XIX. That one should avoid being despised and
hated ....... 147
XX. Are Fortresses, and many other things to which Princes resort, advantageous or hurtful? ...... 165
XXI. How A Prince should conduct Himself so as
to gain Renown . . . . -175
XXII. Concerning the Secretaries of Princes . 183
XXIII. How Flatterers should be avoided . . 189
XXIV. Why the Princes of Italy have lost their
States ....... i95
XXV. What Fortune can effect in Human Affairs,
and how to withstand Her . . . 201
XXVI. An Exhortation to liberate Italy from the
Barbarians ...... 209
Description of the Methods adopted by the Duke Valentino when murdering Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, the Signor Pagolo and the Duke di Gravini Orsini .... 217
The Life of Castruccio Castracani of Lucca, written BY NicoLO Machiavelli, and sent to his Friends Zanobi Buondelmonti and Luigi Alamini . . 230
Notes and References ...... 273
Index 281
NICOLO MACHIAVELLI
TO THE
MAGNIFICENT LORENZO DI PIERO DE
MEDICI
Those who strive to obtain the good graces of a prince -are accustomed to come before him with such things as they hold most precious, or in which they see him take most dehght: whence one often sees horses, arms, cloth of gold, pre- cious stones, and similar ornaments presented to princes, worthy of their greatness.
Desiring therefore to present myself to Your Magnificence with some testimony of my devo- tion towards you, I have not found among my possessions anything which I hold more dear than, or value so much as, the knowledge of the actions of great men, acquired by long experi- ence in contemporary affairs, and a continual study of antiquity ; which, having reflected upon it with great and prolonged dihgence, I now send, digested into a httle volume, to your Magnificence.
And although I may consider this work un- worthy of your countenance, nevertheless I
2 The Prince
trust much to your benignity that it may be acceptable, seeing that it is not possible for me to make a better gift than to offer you the oppor- tunity of understanding in the shortest time all that I have learnt in so many years, and with so many troubles and dangers; — which work I have not embellished with swelling or magnifi- cent words, nor stuffed with rounded periods, nor with any extrinsic allurements or adorn- ments whatever, with which so many are accus- tomed to load and embellish their works; for I have wished either that no honour should be given it, or else that the truth of the matter and the weightiness of the theme shall make it acceptable.
Nor do I hold with those who regard it as pre- sumption if a man of low and humble condition dare to discuss and settle the concerns of princes ; because, just as those who draw landscapes place themselves below in the plain to contemplate the nature of the mountains and of lofty places, and in order to contemplate the plains place themselves high upon the mountains, even so to understand the nature of the people it needs to be a prince, and to understand that of princes it needs to be of the people.
Take then, your Magnificence, this little gift in the spirit in which I send it; wherein, if it be diligently read and considered by you, you will learn my extreme desire that you should attain
Dedication 3
that greatness which fortune and your other attributes promise. And if your Magnificence from the summit of your greatness will some- times turn your eyes to these lower regions, you will see how unmeritedly I suffer a great and continued malignity of fortune.
FIRST CHAPTER
NOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE
ARE. AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY
ARE ACQUIRED
FIRST CHAPTER
HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE, AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE ACQUIRED
All states, all powers, that have held and hold rule over men have been and are either re- publics or principalities.
Principalities are either hereditary, in which the family has been long estabhshed; or they are new.
The new are either entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or they are, as it were, members annexed to the hereditary state of the prince who has acquired them, as was the king- dom of Naples to that of the King of Spain.
Such dominions thus acquired are either ac- customed to live under a prince, or to live in freedom; and are acquired either by the arms of the prince himself, or of others, or else by fortune or by ability.
3280
SECOND CHAPTER
CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES
SECOND CHAPTER
CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES
I WILL leave out all discussion on republics, inasmuch as in another place I have written ol them at length, and will address myself only to principahties. In doing so I will keep to the order indicated above, and discuss how such principahties are to be ruled and preserved,
I say at once there are fewer difficulties in holding hereditary states, and those long accus- tomed to the family of their prince, than new ones; for it is sufficient only not to transgress the customs of his ancestors, and to deal pru- dently with circumstances as they arise, for a prince of average powers to maintain himself in his state, unless he be deprived of it by some extraordinary and excessive force; and if he should be so deprived of it, whenever anything sinister happens to the usurper, he will regain it.
We have in Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara, who could not have withstood the attacks of the Venetians in '84, nor those of Pope Juhus in '10, unless he had been long estabhshed in his dominions. For the heredi-
II
12 The Prince
tary prince has less cause and less necessity to offend; hence it happens that he will be more loved; and unless extraordinary vices cause him to be hated, it is reasonable to expect that his subjects will be naturally well disposed to- wards him; and in the antiquity and duration of his rule the memories and motives that make for change are lost, for one change always leaves tlie addentellation for another.
THIRD CHAPTER
CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITtBS
THIRD CHAPTER
CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES
But the difficulties occur in a new principality. And firstly, if it be not entirely new, but is, as it were, a member of a state which, taken collec- tively, may be called composite, the changes arise chiefly from an inherent difficulty which there is in all new principalities; for men change their rulers willingly, hoping to better them- selves, and this hope induces them to take up arms against him who rules: wherein they are deceived, because they afterwards find by ex- perience they have gone from bad to worse. This follows also on another natural and common necessity, which always causes a new prince to burthen those who have submitted to him with his soldiery and with infinite other hardships which he must put upon his new acquisition.
In this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in seizing that princi- pahty, and you are not able to keep those friends who put you there because of your not being able to satisf}^ them in the way they expected, and vou cannot take strong measures against
*B ^So I^
1 6 The Prince
them, feeling bound to them. For, although one may be very strong in armed forces, yet in entering a province one has always need of the goodwill of the natives.
For these reasons Louis the Twelfth, King of France, quickly occupied Milan, and as quickly lost it; and to turn him out the first time it only needed Lodovico's own forces; because those who had opened the gates to him, finding themselves deceived in their hopes of future benefit, would not endure the ill-treatment of the new prince. It is very true that, after ac- quiring rebellious provinces a second time, they are not so lightly lost afterwards, because the prince, with httle reluctance, takes the oppor- tunity of the rebellion to punish the dehnquents, to clear out the suspects, and to strengthen himself in the weakest places. Thus to cause France to lose Milan the first time it was enough for the Duke Lodovico to raise insurrections on the borders ; but to cause him to lose it a second time it was necessary to bring the whole world against him, and that his armies should be de- feated and driven out of Italy; which followed from the causes above mentioned.
Nevertheless Milan was taken from France both the first and the second time. The general reasons for the first have been discussed; it re- mains to name those for the second, and to see
* See Note.
Mixed Principalities 17
what resources he had, and what any one in his situation would have had for maintaining him- self more securely in his acquisition than did the King of France,
Now I say that those dominions which, when acquired, are added to an ancient state by him who acquires them, are either of the same coun- try and language, or they are not. When they are, it is easier to hold them, especially when they have not been accustomed to self-govern- ment ; and to hold them securely it is enough to have destroyed the family of the prince who was ruling them; because the two peoples, preserv- ing in other things the old conditions, and not being unlike in customs, will live quietly to- gether, as one has seen in Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony, and Normandy, which have been bound to France for so long a time: and, al- though there may be some difference in language, nevertheless the customs are alike, and the people will easily be able to get on amongst themselves. He who has annexed them, if he wishes to hold them, has only to bear in mind two considerations: the one, that the family of their former lord is extinguished; the other, that neither their laws nor their taxes are altered, so that in a very short time they will become entirely one body with the old prin- cipality.
But when states are acquired in a coxmtry
1 8 The Prince
differing in language, customs, or laws, there are difficulties, and good fortune and great energy are needed to hold them, and one of the greatest and most real helps would be that he who has acquired them should go and reside there. This would make his position more secure and dur- able, as it has made that of the Turk in Greece, who, notwithstanding all the other measures taken by him for holding that state, if he had not settled there, would not have been able to keep it. Because, if one is on the spot, disorders are seen as they spring up, and one can quickly remedy them ; but if one is not at hand, they are heard of only when they are great, and then one can no longer remedy them. Besides this, the country is not pillaged by your officials; the subjects are satisfied by prompt recourse to the prince; thus, wishing to be good, they have more cause to love him, and wishing to be other- wise, to fear him. He who would attack that state from the outside must have the utmost caution; as long as the prince resides there it can only be wrested from him with the greatest difficulty.
The other and better course is to send colonies to one or two places, which may be as keys to that state, for it is necessary either to do this or else to keep there a great number of cavalry and infantry. A prince does not spend much on colonies, for with little or no expense he
Mixed Principalities 19
can send them out and keep them there, and he offends a minority only of the citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give them to the new inhabitants; and those whom he offends, remaining poor and scattered, are never able to injure him; whilst the rest being uninjured are easily kept quiet, and at the same time are anxious not to err for fear it should happen to them as it has to those who have been despoiled. In conclusion, I say that these colonies are not costly, they are more faithful, they injure less, and the injured, as has been said, being poor and scattered, cannot hurt. Upon this one has to remark that men ought either to be well treated or crushed, because they can avenge themselves of hghter injuries, of more serious ones they cannot; therefore the injury that is to be done to a man ought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in fear of revenge.
But in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends much more, having to consume on the garrison all the income from the state, so that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are exasperated, because the whole state is injured; through the shifting of the garrison up and down all become acquainted with hardship, and all become hostile, and they are enemies who, whilst beaten on their own ground, are yet able to do hurt. For every
20 The Prince
reason, therefore, such guards are as useless as a colony is useful.
Again, the prince who holds a country differ- ing in the above respects ought to make himself the head and defender of his less powerful neighbours, and to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking care that no foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get a footing there; for it will always happen that such a one will be introduced by those who are discontented, either through excess of ambi- tion or through fear, as one has seen already. The Romans were brought into Greece by the iEtohans; and in every other country where they obtained a footing they were brought in by the inhabitants. And the usual course of affairs is that, as soon as a powerful foreigner enters a country, all the subject states are drawn to him, moved by the hatred which they feel against the ruUng power. So that in respect to these subject states he has not to take any trouble to gain them over to himself, for the whole of them quickly rally to the state which he has acquired there. He has only to take care that they do not get hold of too much power and too much authority, and then with his own forces, and with their goodwill, he can easily keep down the more powerful of them, so as to remain entirely master in the country. And he who does not properly manage this business will soon lose
Mixed Principalities 21
what he has acquired, and whilst he does hold it he will have endless diflficulties and troubles.
The Romans, in the countries which they annexed, observed closely these measures ; they sent colonies and maintained friendly relations with ^ the minor powers, without increasing their stren^h; they kept down the greater, and did not aUow any strong foreign powers to gain authority. Greece appears to me sufficient for an example. The Achaians and ^tolians were kept friendly by them, the kingdom of Mace- donia was humbled, Anriochus was driven out; yet the merits of the Achaians and iEtolians never secured for them permission to increase their f)ower, nor did the persuasions of Philip ever induce the Romans to be his friends without first humbhng him, nor did the influence of Antiochus make them agree that he should retain any lordship over the country. Because the Romans did in these instances what aU prudent princes ought to do, who have to regard not only present troubles, but also future ones, for which they must prepare with every energy, because, when foreseen, it is easy to remedy them ; but if you wait until they approach, the medicine is no longer in time because the malady has become incurable; for it happens in this, as the physi- cians say it happens in hectic fever, that in the beginning of the malady it is easy to cure but
« See Note.
22 The Prince
difficult to detect, but in the course of time, not
having been either detected nor treated in the
beginning, it becomes easy to detect but difficult
to cure. Thus it happens in affairs of state,
for when the evils that arise have been foreseen
(which it is only given to a wise man to see), they
can be quickly redressed, but when, through not
having been foreseen, they have been permitted
to grow in a way that every one can see them,
there is no longer a remedy. Therefore, the
Romans, foreseeing troubles, dealt with them
at once, and, even to avoid a war, would not
let them come to a head, for they knew that
war is not to be avoided, but is only put off to
the advantage of others; moreover they wished
to fight with Phihp and Antiochus in Greece so
as not to have to do it in Italy ; they could have
avoided both, but this they did not wish; nor
did that ever please them which is for ever in
the mouths of the wise ones of our time: — Let
us enjoy the benefits of the time — but rather the
benefits of their own valour and prudence, for
time drives everything before it, and is able to
bring with it good as well as evil, and evil as well
as good.
But let us turn to France and inquire whether she has done any of the things mentioned. I will speak of Louis (and not of Charles) as the one whose conduct is the better to be observed, he having held possession of Italy for the longest
Mixed Principalities 23
period; and you will see that he has done the opposite to those things which ought to be done to retain a state composed of divers elements.
King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians, who desired to obtain half the state of Lombardy by his interven- tion. I will not blame the course taken by the king, because, wishing to get a foot-hold in Italy, and having no friends there — seeing rather that every door was shut to him owing to the conduct of Charles — he was forced to accept those friendships which he could get, and he would have succeeded very quickly in his design if in other matters he had not made some mis- takes. The king, however, having acquired Lombardy, regained at once the authority which Charles had lost: Genoa yielded; the Floren- tines became his friends ; the Marquis of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, the BentivogH, my lady of Forli, the Lords of Faenza, of Pesaro, of Rimini, of Camerino, of Piombino, the Lucchese, the Pisanians, the Sienese — everybody made ad- vances to him to become his friend. Then could the Venetians reahse the rashness of the course taken by them, which, in order that they might secure two towns in Lombardy, had made the king master of two-thirds of Italy.
Let any one now consider with what httle difficulty the king could have maintained his position in Italy had he observed the rules above
24 The Prince
laid down, and kept all his friends secure and protected ; for although they were numerous they were both weak and timid, some afraid of the Church, some of the Venetians, and thus they would always have been forced to stand in with him, and by their means he could easily have made himself secure against those who remained powerful. But he was no sooner in Milan than he did the contrary by assisting Pope Alexander to occupy the Romagna. It never occurred to him that by this action he was weakening him- self, depriving himself of friends and of those who had thrown themselves into his lap, whilst he aggrandised the Church by adding much tem- poral power to the spiritual, thus giving it great authority. And having committed this prime error, he was obliged to follow it up, so much so that, to put an end to the ambition of Alexander, and to prevent his becoming the master of Tus- cany, he was himself forced to come into Italy.
And as if it were not enough to have aggran- dised the Church, and deprived himself of friends, he, wishing to have the kingdom of Naples, divides it with the King of Spain, and where he was the prime arbiter of Italy he takes an asso- ciate, so that the ambitious of that country and the malcontents of his own should have where to shelter; and whereas he could have left in the kingdom his own pensioner as king, he
Mixed Principalities 25
drove him out, to put one there who was able to drive him, Louis, out in turn.
The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men always do so when they can, and for this they will be praised not blamed; but when they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means, then there is folly and blame. There- fore, if France could have attacked Naples with her own forces she ought to have done so ; if she could not, then she ought not to have divided it. And if the partition which she made with the Venetians in Lombardy was justified by the ex- cuse that by it she got a foot-hold in Italy, this other partition merited blame, for it had not the excuse of that necessity.
Therefore Louis made these five errors: he destroyed the minor powers, he increased the strength of one of the greater powers in Italy, he brought in a foreign power, he did not settle in the country, he did not send colonies. Which errors, if he had lived, were not enough to injure him had he not made a sixth by taking away their dominions from the Venetians; because, had he not aggrandised the Church, nor brought Spain into Italy, it would have been very reasonable and necessary to humble them; but having first taken these steps, he ought never to have consented to their ruin, for they, being powerful, would always have kept off others from designs on Lombardy, to which the Vene-
26 The Prince
tians would never have consented except to be- come masters themselves there; also because the others would not wish to take Lombardy from France in order to give it to the Venetians, and to run counter to both they would not have had the courage.
And if any one should say : King Louis yielded the Romagna to Alexander and the kingdom to Spain to avoid war, I answer for the reasons given above that a blunder ought never to be perpetrated to avoid war, because it is not to be avoided, but is only deferred to your disadvantage. And if another should allege the pledge which the king had given to the Pope that he would assist him in the enterprise in exchange for the dissolution of his marriage and for the cap to Rouen, to that I reply what I shall write later on concerning the faith of princes, and how it ought to be kept.
Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not hav- ing followed any of the conditions observed by those who have taken possession of countries and wished to retain them. Nor is there any miracle in this, but much that is reasonable and quite natural. And on these matters I spoke at Nantes with Rouen, when Valentino, as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope Alexander, was usually called, occupied the Romagna, and on Cardinal Rouen observing to me that the Italians did not understand war, I replied to him that the French
Mixed Principalities 27
did not understand statecraft, meaning that otherwise they would not have allowed the Church to reach such greatness. And in fact it has been seen that the greatness of the Church and of Spain in Italy has been caused by France, and her ruin may be attributed to them. From this a general rule is drawn which never or rarely fails : that he who is the cause of another becoming powerful is ruined; because that pre- dominancy has been brought about either by astuteness or else by force, and both are dis- trusted by him who has been raised to power.
FOURTH CHAPTER
WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS. CONQUERED BY
ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL AGAINST
THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER
AT HIS DEATH
FOURTH CHAPTER
WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH
Considering the difficulties which men have had to hold a newly acquired state, some might wonder how, seeing that Alexander the Great became the master of Asia in a few years, and died whilst it was yet scarcely settled (whence it might appear reasonable that the whole em- pire would have rebelled), nevertheless his suc- cessors maintained themselves, and had to meet no other difficulty than that which arose among themselves from their own ambitions.
I answer that the principalities of which one has record are found to be governed in two dif- ferent ways : either by a prince, with a body of servants, who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by his favour and permission; or by a prince and barons, who hold that dignity by antiquity of blood and not by the grace of the prince. Such barons have states and their own subjects, who recognise them as lords and hold them in natural affection. Those states
31
32 The Prince
that are governed by a prince and his servants hold their prince in more consideration, because in all the country there is no one who is recog- nised as superior to him, and if they yield obedi- ence to another they do it as to a minister and official, and they do not bear him any particular affection.
The examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and the King of France. The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one lord, the others are his servants ; and, divid- ing his kingdom into sandjacks,. he sends there different administrators, and shifts and changes them as he chooses. But the King of France is placed in the midst of an ancient body of lords, acknowledged by their own subjects, and be- loved by them; they have their own preroga- tives, nor can the king take these away except at his peril. Therefore, he who considers both of these states will recognise great diffi- culties in seizing the state of the Turk, but, once it is conquered, great ease in holding it. The causes of the difficulties in seizing the king- dom of the Turk are that the usurper cannot be called in by the princes of the kingdom, nor can he hope to be assisted in his designs by the revolt of those whom the lord has around him. This arises from the reasons given above; for his ministers, being all slaves and bondmen, can only be corrupted with great difficulty, and one
Kingdom of Darius 33
can expect but little advantage from them when they have been corrupted, as they cannot carry the people with them, for the reasons assigned. Hence, he who attacks the Turk must bear in mind that he will find him united, and he will have to rely more on his own strength than on the revolt of others; but, if once the Turk has been conquered, and routed in the field in such a way that he cannot replace his armies, there is nothing to fear but the family of the prince, and, this being exterminated, there remains no one to fear, the others having no credit with the people; and as the conqueror did not rely on them before his victory, so he ought not to fear them after it.
The contrary happens in kingdoms governed like that of France, because one can easily enter there by gaining over some baron of the king- dom, for one always finds malcontents and such as desire a change. Such men, for the reasons given, can open the way into the state and render the victory easy ; but if you wish to hold it afterwards, you meet with infinite difficulties, both from those who have assisted you and from those you have crushed. Nor is it enough for you to have exterminated the family of the prince, because the lords that remain make themselves the heads of fresh movements against you, and as you are unable either to
34 The Prince
satisfy or exterminate them, that state is lost whenever time brings the opportunity.
Now if you will consider what was the nature of the government of Darius, you will find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk, and there- fore it was only necessary for Alexander, first to overthrow him in the field, and then to take the country from him. After which victory, Darius being lolled, the state remained secure to Alex- ander, for the above reasons. And if his suc- cessors had been united they would have enjoyed it securely and at their ease, for there were no tumults raised in the kingdom except those they provoked themselves.
But it is impossible to hold with such tran- quillity states constituted like that of France. Hence arose those frequent rebellions against the Romans in Spain, France, and Greece, owing to the many principalities there were in these states, of which, as long as the memory of them endured, the Romans always held an insecure possession; but with the power and long con- tinuance of the empire the memory' of them passed away, and the Romans then became secure possessors. And when fighting afterwards amongst themselves, each one was able to attach to himself his own parts of the country, according to the authority he had assumed there; and the family of the former lord being exterminated, none other than the Romans were acknowledged.
Kingdom of Darius 3 5
When these things are remembered no one will marvel at the ease with which Alexander held the Empire of Asia, or at the difficulties which others have had to keep an acquisition, such as Pyrrhus and many more; this is not occasioned by the httle or abundance of ability in the conqueror, but by the want of imifonnity in the subject state.
FIFTH CHAPTER
CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR
PRINCIPALITIES WHICH LIVED UNDER
THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY
WERE ANNEXED
FIFTH CHAPTER
CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH LIVED UNDER THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED
Whenever those states which have been ac- quired as stated have been accustomed to hve under their own laws and in freedom, there are three courses for those who wish to hold them: the first is to ruin them, the next is to reside there in person, the third is to permit them to live under their own laws, drawing a tribute, and estabhshing within it an oligarchy which will keep it friendly to you. Because such a government, being created by the prince, knows that it cannot stand \sithout his friendship and interest, and does its utmost to support him; and therefore he who would keep a city accus- tomed to freedom will hold it more easily by the means of its own citizens than in any other way. There are, for example, the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans held Athens and Thebes, establishing there an oligarchy, never- theless they lost them. The Romans, in order c 280 29
4© The Prince
to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia, dis- mantled them, and did not lose them. They wished to hold Greece as the Spartans held it, making it free and permitting its laws, and did not succeed. So to hold it they were compelled to dismantle many cities in the country, for in truth there is no safe way to retain them other- wise than by ruining them. And he who becomes master of a city accustomed to freedom and does not destroy it, may expect to be destroyed by it, for in rebellion it has always the watch- word of hberty and its ancient privileges as a ralljdng point, which neither time nor benefits will ever cause it to forget. And whatever you may do or provide against, they never forget that name or their privileges unless they are disunited or dispersed, but at every chance they immediately rally to them, as Pisa did after the one hundred years she had been held in bondage by the Florentines.
But when cities or countries are accustomed to Hve under a prince, and his family is exter- minated, they, being on the one hand accus- tomed to obey and on the other hand not having the old prince, cannot agree in making one from amongst themselves, and they do not know how to govern themselves. For this reason they are very slow to take up arms, and a prince can gain them to himself and secure them much more easily. But in republics there is more vitality.
The Way to Govern Cities 41
greater hatred, and more desire for vengeance, which will never permit them to allow the memory of their former hberty to rest; so that the safest way is to destroy them or to reside there.
SIXTH CHAPTER
CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE
ACQUIRED BY ONE'S OWN ARMS
AND ABILITY
SIXTH CHAPTER
CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED BY ONE'S OWN ARMS AND ABILITY
Let no one be surprised if, in speaking of en- tirely new principalities as I shall do, I adduce the highest examples both of prince and of state; because men, walking almost always in paths beaten by others, and following by imita- tion their deeds, are yet unable to keep entirely to the ways of others or attain to the power of those they imitate. A wise man ought always to follow the paths beaten by great men, and to imitate those who have been supreme, so that if his ability does not equal theirs, at least it will savour of it. Let him act like the clever archers who, designing to hit the mark which yet ap- pears too far distant, and knowing the limits to which the strength of their bow attains, take aim much higher than the mark, not to reach by their strength or arrow to so great a height, but to be able with the aid of so high an aim to hit the mark they wish to reach.
I say, therefore, that in entirely new princi- palities, where there is a new prince, more or
45
46 The Prince
less difficulty is found in keeping them, accord- ingly as there is more or less abihty in him who has acquired the state. Now, as the fact of becoming a prince from a private station pre- supposes either ability or fortune, it is clear that one or other of these two things will mitigate in some degree many difficulties. Nevertheless, he who has relied least on fortune is established the strongest. Further, it faciUtates matters when the prince, having no other state, is com- pelled to reside there in person.
But to come to those who, by their own ability and not through fortune, have risen to be princes, I say that Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, and such hke are the most excellent examples. And although one may not discuss Moses, he having been a mere executor of the will of God, yet he ought to be admired, if only for that favour which made him worthy to speak with God. But in considering Cyrus and others who have acquired or founded kingdoms, ail will be found admirable ; and if their particular deeds and conduct shall be considered, they will not be found inferior to those of Moses, although he had so great a preceptor. And in examining their actions and lives one cannot see that they owed anything to fortune beyond opportunity, which brought them the material to mould into the form which seemed best to them. Without that opportunity their powers of mind would
New Principalities 47
have been extinguished, and without those powers the opportunity would have come in vain.
It was necessary, therefore, to Moses that he should find the people of Israel in Egypt en- slaved and oppressed by the Egyptians, in order that they should be disposed to follow him so as to be deUvered out of bondage. It was neces- sary that Romulus should not remain in Alba, and that he should be abandoned at his birth, in order that he should become King of Rome and founder of the fatherland. It was necessary that Cyrus should find the Persians discontented with the government of the Medes, and the Medes soft and effeminate through their long peace. Theseus could not have shown his ability had he not found the Athenians dis- persed. These opportunities, therefore, made those men fortunate, and their high ability enabled them to recognise the opportunity whereby their country was ennobled and made famous.
Those who by valorous ways become princes, hke these men, acquire a principaUty with diffi- culty, but they keep it with ease. The diffi- culties they have in acquiring it arise in part from the new rules and methods which they are forced to introduce to establish their government and its security. And it ought to be remembered that there is nothing more diffi-
*Q 280
48 The Prince
cult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things. Because the innovator has for enemies all those who have done well under the old con- ditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new. This coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws on their side, and partly from the in- credulity of men, who do not readily beheve in new things until they have had a long experi- ence of them. Thus it happens that whenever those who axe hostile have the opportunity to attack they do it like partisans, whilst the others defend lukewarmly, in such wise that the prince is endangered along with them.
It is necessary, therefore, if we desire to dis- cuss this matter thoroughly, to inquire whether these innovators can rely on themselves or have to depend on others: that is to say, whether, to consummate their enterprise, have they to use prayers or can they use force? In the first instance they always succeed badly, and never compass anything; but when they can rely on themselves and use force, then they are rarely endangered. Hence it is that all armed prophets have conquered, and the im- armed ones have been destroyed. Besides the reasons mentioned, the nature of the people is variable, and whilst it is easy to peisuade them,
New Principalities 49
it is difficult to fix them in that persuasion. And thus it is necessary to take such measures that, when they beheve no longer, it may be possible to make them believe by force.
If Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus had been unarmed they could not have enforced their constitutions for long — as happened in our time to Fra Girolamo Savonarola, who was ruined with his new order of things immedi- ately the multitude believed in him no longer, and he had no means of keeping steadfast those who beheved or of making the unbelievers to beheve. Therefore such as these have great difficulties in consummating their enterprise, for aU their dangers are in the ascent, yet with ability they will overcome them; but when these are overcome, and those who envied them their success are exterminated, they wLll begin to be respected, and they will continue after- wards powerful, secure, honoured, and happy.
To these great examples I wish to add a lesser one; still it bears some resemblance to them, and I wish it to suffice me for all of a Hke kind : it is Hiero the Syracusan. This man rose from a private station to be Prince of Syracuse, nor did he, either, owe anything to fortune but opportunity; for the Syracusans, being op- pressed, chose him for their captain, afterwards he was rewarded by being made their prince. He was of so great abihty, even as a private
50 The Prince
citizen, that one who writes of him says he wanted nothing but a kingdom to be a king. This man aboHshed the old soldiery, organised the new, gave up old alliances, made new ones; and as he had his own soldiers and alhes, on such foun- dations he was able to build any edifice : thus, whilst he had endured much trouble in acquiring, he had but Uttle in keeping.
SEVENTH CHAPTER
CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE
ACQUIRED EITHER BY THE ARMS OF
OTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE
SEVENTH CHAPTER
CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED EITHER BY THE ARMS OF OTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE
Those who solely by good fortune become princes from being private citizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop ; they have not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they have many when they reach the summit. Such are those to whom some state is given either for money or by the favour of him who bestows it; as happened to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of the Hellespont, where princes were made by Darius, in order that they might hold the cities both for his security and his glory; as also were those emperors who, by the corruption of the soldiers, from being citizens came to empire. Such stand simply upon the goodwill and the fortune of him who has elevated them — two most inconstant and unstable things. Neither have they the knowledge requisite for the posi- tion; because, unless they are men of great worth and ability, it is not reasonable to expect
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that they should know how to command, having always lived in a private condition; besides, they cannot hold it because they have not forces which they can keep friendly and faithful.
States that rise unexpectedly, then, hke all other things in nature which are bom and grow rapidly, cannot have their foundations and correspondencies i fixed in such a way that the first storm will not overthrow them; unless, as is said, those who unexpectedly become princes are men of so much ability that they know they have to be prepared at once to hold that which fortune has thrown into their laps, and that those foundations, which others have laid before they became princes, they must lay afterwards.
Concerning these two methods of rising to be a prince by abihty or fortune, I wish to adduce two examples within our own recollection, and these are Francesco Sforza and Cesare Borgia. Francesco, by proper means and with great abiUty, from being a private person rose to be Duke of Milan, and that which he had acquired with a thousand anxieties he kept with httle trouble. On the other hand, Cesare Borgia, called by the people Duke Valentino, acquired his State during the ascendency of his father, and on its dechne he lost it, notwithstanding that he had taken every measure and done all that ought to be done by a wise and able man
• See Note.
New Principalities 55
to fix firmly his roots in the states which the arms and fortunes of others had bestowed on him.
Because, as is stated above, he who has not first laid his foundations may be able with great ability to lay them afterwards, but they will be laid with trouble to the architect and danger to the building. If, therefore, all the steps taken by the duke be considered, it will be seen that he laid solid foundations for his future power, and I do not consider it superfluous to discuss them, because I do not know what better precepts to give a new prince than the example of his actions ; and if his dispositions were of no avail, that was not his fault, but the extraordinary and extreme malignity of fortune.
Alexander the Sixth, in wishing to aggrandise the duke, his son, had many immediate and pro- spective difficulties. Firstly, he did not see his way to make him master of any state that was not a state of the Church ; and if he was willing to rob the Church he knew that the Duke of Milan and the Venetians would not consent, because Faenza and Rimini were already under the protection of the Venetians. Besides this, he saw the arms of Italy, especially those by which he might have been assisted, in hands that would fear the aggrandisement of the Pope, namely, the Orsini and the Colonnesi and their following. It behoved him, therefore, to upset this state of affairs and embroil the powers, so as
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to make himself securely master of part of their states. This was easy for him to do, because he fotmd the Venetians, moved by other reasons, inchned to bring back the French into Italy; he would not only not oppose this, but he would render it more easy by dissolving the former marriage of King Louis. Therefore the king came into Italy with the assistance of the Vene- tians and the consent of Alexander. He was no sooner in Milan than the Pope had soldiers from him for the attempt on the Romagna, which yielded to him on the reputation of the king. The duke, therefore, having acquired the Romagna and beaten the Colonnesi, while wish- ing to hold that and to advance further, was hindered by two things : the one, his forces did not appear loyal to him, the other, the goodwill of France : that is to say, he feared that the forces of the Orsini, which he was using, would not stand to him, that not only might they hinder him from winning more, but might themselves seize what he had won, and that the king might also do the same. Of the Orsini he had a warning when, after taking Faenza and attacking Bologna, he saw them go very unwil- lingly to that attack. And as to the king, he learned his mind when he himself, after taking the Duchy of Urbino, attacked Tuscany, and the king made him desist from that undertak- ing; hence the duke decided to depend no more upon the arms and the luck of others.
New Principalities 57
For the first thing he weakened the Orsini and Colonnesi parties in Rome, by gaining to himself all their adherents who were gentle- men, making them his gentlemen, giving them good pay, and, according to their rank, honour- ing them with office and command in such a way that in a few months aU attachment to the factions was destroyed and turned entirely to the duke. After this he awaited an opportunity to crush the Orsini, having scattered the ad- herents of the Colonna house. This came to him soon and he used it well; for the Orsini, perceiv- ing at length that the aggrandisement of the duke and the Church was ruin to them, called a meeting at Magione in Perugia. From this sprung the rebeUion at Urbino and the tumults in the Romagna, with endless dangers to the duke, all of which he overcame with the help of the French. Having restored his authority, not to leave it at risk by trusting either to the French or other outside forces, he had recourse to his wiles, and he knew so well how to conceal his mind that, by the mediation of Signor Pagolo — whom the duke did not fail to secure with all kinds of attentions, giving him money, apparel, and horses — the Orsini were reconciled, so that their simphcity brought them into his power at Sinigaha.^ Having exterminated the leaders, and turned their partisans into his friends, the
» See Note.
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duke had laid sufficiently good foundations to his power, having all the Romagna and the Duchy of Urbino; and the people now begin- ning to appreciate their prosperity, he gained them all over to himself. And as this point is worthy of notice, and to be imitated by others, I am not willing to leave it out.
When the duke occupied the Romagna he found it under the rule of weak masters, who rather plundered their subjects than ruled them, and gave them more cause for disunion than for union, so that the country was full of robbery, -quarrels, and every kind of violence; and so, •wishing to bring back peace and obedience to authority, he considered it necessary to give it a good governor. Thereupon he promoted Messer Ramiro d'Orco, a swift and cruel man, to whom he gave the fullest power. This man in a short time restored peace and unity with the greatest success. Afterwards the duke con- sidered that it was not advisable to confer such excessive authority, for he had no doubt but that he would become odious, so he set up a court of judgment in the country, under a most excellent president, wherein all cities had their advocates. And because he knew that the past severity had caused some hatred against him- self, so, to clear himself in the minds of the people, and gain them entirely to himself, he desired to show that, if any cruelty had been
New Principalities 59
practised, it had not originated with him, but in the natural sternness of the minister. Under this pretence he took Ramiro, and one morning caused him to be executed and left on the piazza at Cesena with the block and a bloody knife at his side. The barbarity of this spectacle caused the people to be at once satisfied and dismayed.
But let us return whence we started. I say that the duke, finding himself now sufficiently powerful and partly secured from immediate dangers by having armed himself in his own way, and having in a great measure crushed those forces in his vicinity that could injure him if he wished to proceed with his conquest, had next to consider France, for he knew that the king, who too late was aware of his mistake, would not support him. And from this time he began to seek new alliances and to temporise with France in the expedition which she was making towards the kingdom of Naples against the Spaniards who were besieging Gaeta. It v/as his intention to secure himself against them, and this he would have quickly accomphshed had Alexander lived.
Such was his line of action as to present affairs. But as to the future he had to fear, in the first place, that a new successor to the Church might not be friendly to him and might seek to take from him that which Alexander had given him, so he decided to act in four ways. Firstly, by
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exterminating the families of those lords whom he had despoiled, so as to take away that pre- text from the Pope. Secondly, by winning to himself all the gentlemen of Rome, so as to be able to curb the Pope with their aid, as has been observed. Thirdly, by converting the coUege more to himself. Fourthly, by acquiring so much power before the Pope should die that he could by his own measures resist the first shock. Of these four things, at the death of Alexander, he had accomplished three. For he had killed as many of the dispossessed lords as he could lay hands on, and few had escaped; he had won over the Roman gentlemen, and he had the most numerous party in the coUege. And as to any fresh acquisition, he intended to become master of Tuscany, for he already possessed Perugia and Piombino, and Pisa was under his protection. And as he had no longer to study France (for the French were already driven out of the kingdom of Naples by the Spaniards, and in this way both were compelled to buy liis good- will), he pounced down upon Pisa. After this, Lucca and Siena yielded at once, partly through hatred and partly through fear of the Floren- tines; and the Florentines would have had no remedy had he continued to prosper, as he was prospering the year that Alexander died, for he had acquired so much power and reputation that he would have stood by himself, and no longer
New Principalities 6i
have depended on the luck and the forces of others, but solely on his own power and ability.
But Alexander died five years after he had first drawn the sword. He left the duke with the state of Romagna alone consolidated, with the rest in the air, between two most powerful hostile armies, and sick unto death. Yet there were in the duke such boldness and abiUty, and he knew so well how men are to be won or lost, and so firm were the foundations which in so short a time he had laid, that if he had not had those armies on his back, or if he had been in good health, he would have overcome aU diffi- culties. And it is seen that his foundations were good, for the Romagna awaited him for more than a month. In Rome, although but half alive, he remained secure; and whilst the Baghoni, the ViteUi, and the Orsini might come to Rome, they could not effect anything against him. If he could not have made Pope him whom he wished, at least the one whom he did not wish would not have been elected. But if he had been in sound health at the death of Alexander, everything would have been easy to him. On the day that Juhus the Second was elected, he told me that he had thought of every- thing that might occur at the death of his father, and had provided a remedy for all, except that he had never anticipated that, when the death
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did happen, he himself would be on the point to die.
When all the actions of the duke are recalled, I do not know how to blame him, but rather it appears to me, as I have said, that I ought to offer him for imitation to all those who, by the fortune or the arms of others, are raised to government. Because he, having a lofty spirit and far-reaching aims, could not have regulated his conduct otherwise, and only the shortness of the Ufe of Alexander and his own sickness frustrated his designs. Therefore, he who con- siders it necessary to secure himself in his new principality, to win friends, to overcome either by force or fraud, to make himself beloved and feared by the people, to be followed and re- vered by the soldiers, to exterminate those who had power or reason to hurt him, to change the old order of things for new, to be severe cind gracious, magnanimous and hberal, to destroy a disloyal soldiery and to create new, to maintain friend- ship with kings and princes in such a way that they must help him with zeal and offend with caution, cannot find a more Hvely example than the actions of this man.
Only can he be blamed for the election of Julius the Second, in whom he made a bad choice, because, as is said, not being able to elect a Pope to his own mind, he could have hindered any other from being elected Pope;
New Principalities 63
and he ought never to have consented to the election of any cardinal whom he had injured or who had cause to fear him if they became pontiffs. For men injure either from fear or hatred. Those whom he had injured, amongst others, were San Pietro ad Vincula, Colonna, San Giorgio, and Ascanio. The rest, in becom- ing Pope, had to fear him, Rouen and the Spaniards excepted ; the latter from their rela- tionship and obhgations, the former from his influence, the kingdom of France having rela- tions with him. Therefore, above everything, the duke ought to have created a Spaniard Pope, and, failing him, he ought to have con- sented to Rouen and not San Pietro ad Vincula. He who believes that new benefits will cause great personages to forget old injuries is de- ceived. Therefore, the duke erred in his choice, and it was the cause of his ultimate ruin.
EIGHTH CHAPTER
CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY WICKEDNESS
EIGHTH CHAPTER
CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY WICKEDNESS
Although a prince may rise from a private station in two ways, neither of which can be entirely attributed to fori:une or genius, yet it is manifest to me that I must not be silent on them, although one could be more copiously treated when I discuss republics. These methods are when, either by some wicked or nefarious ways, one ascends to the principality, or when by the favour of his fellow-citizens a private person becomes the prince of his country. And speak- ing of the first method, it will be illustrated by two examples — one ancient, the other modem — and without entering further into the subject, I consider these two examples will suffice those who may be compelled to follow them.
Agathocles, the Sicilian, became King of Syracuse not only from a private but from a low and abject position. This man, the son of a potter, through all the changes in his fortunes always led an infamous life. Nevertheless, he accompanied his infamies with so much ability
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of mind and body that, having devoted himself to the mihtary profession, he rose through its ranks to be Praetor of Syracuse. Being estab- hshed in that position, and having dehberately resolved to make himself prince and to seize by violence, without obligation to others, that which had been conceded to him by assent, he came to an understanding for this purpose with Amilcar, the Carthaginian, who, with his army, was fighting in Sicily. One morning he as- sembled the people and senate of Syracuse, as if he had to discuss with them things relating to the Republic, and at a given signal the soldiers killed all the senators and the richest of the people; these dead, he seized and held the princedom of that city without any civil com- motion. And although he was twice routed by the Carthaginians, and ultimately besieged, yet not only was he able to defend his city, but leaving part of his men for its defence, with the others he attacked Africa, and in a short time raised the siege of Syracuse. The Carthaginians, reduced to extreme necessity, were compelled to come to terms with Agathocles, and, leaving Sicily to him, had to be content with the posses- sion of Africa,
Therefore, he who considers the actions and the genius of this man will see nothing, or little, which can be attributed to fortune, inasmuch as he attained pre-eminence, as is shown above.
A Principality Obtained 69
not by the favour of any one, but step by step in the military profession, which steps were gained with a thousand troubles and perils, and were afterwards boldly held by him with many hazards and dangers. Yet it cannot be called talent to slay fellow-citizens, to deceive friends, to be without faith, without mercy, without religion; such methods may gain empire, but not glory. Still, if the courage of Agathocles in entering into and extricating himself from dangers be considered, together with his greatness of mind in enduring and overcoming hardships, it can- not be seen why he should be esteemed less than the most notable captain. Nevertheless, his barbarous cruelty and inhumanity with infinite wickednesses do not permit him to be celebrated among the most excellent men. What he achieved cannot be attributed either to fortune or to genius.
In our times, during the rule of Alexander the Sixth, Oliverotto da Fermo, having been left an orphan many years before, was brought up by his maternal uncle, Giovanni Foghani, and in the early days of his youth sent to fight under Pagolo ViteUi, that, being trained under his discipline, he might attain some high position in the mihtary profession. After Pagolo died, he fought under his brother Vitellozzo, and in a very short time, being endowed with wit and a vigorous body and mind, he became the first
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man in his profession. But it appearing to him a paltry thing to serve under others, he resolved, with the aid of some citizens of Fermo, to whom the slavery of their country was dearer than its hberty, and with the help of the Vitelleschi, to seize Fermo. So he wrote to Giovanni Fogliani that, having been away from home for many years, he wished to visit him and his city, and in some measure to look into his patrimony; and although he had not laboured to acquire anything except honour, yet, in order that the citizens should see he had not spent his time in vain, he desired to come honourably, so would be accompanied by one hundred horsemen, his friends and retainers ; and he entreated Giovanni to arrange that he should be received honour- ably by the Fermanese, all of which would be not only to his honour, but also to that of Giovanni himself, who had brought him up.
Giovanni, therefore, did not fail in any atten- tions due to his nephew, and he caused him to be honourably received by the Fermanese, and he lodged him in his own house, where, having passed some days, and having arranged what was necessary for his wicked designs, OHverotto gave a solemn banquet to which he invited Giovanni Fogliani and the chiefs of Fermo. When the viands and all the other entertain- ments that are usual in such banquets were finished, Oliverotto artfully began certain grave
A Principality Obtained 71
discourses, speaking of the greatness of Pope Alexander and his son Cesare, and of their enter- prises, to which discourse Giovanni and others answered; but he rose at once, saying that such matters ought to be discussed in a more private place, and he betook himself to a chamber, whither Giovanni and the rest of the citizens went in after him. No sooner were they seated than soldiers issued from secret places and slaughtered Giovanni and the rest. After these murders Oliverotto, mounted on horseback, rode up and down the town and besieged the chief magis- trate in the palace, so that in fear the people were forced to obey him, and to form a govern- ment, of which he made himself the prince. He killed all the malcontents who were able to injure him, and strengthened himself with new civil and military ordinances, in such a way that, in the year during which he held the prin- cipality, not only was he secure in the city of Fermo, but he had become formidable to all his neighbours. And his destruction would have been as difficult as that of Agathocles if he had not allowed himself to be over-reached by Cesare Borgia, who took him with the Orsini and ViteUi at Sinigalia, as was stated above. Thus one year after he had committed this parricide, he was strangled, together with Vitellozzo, whom he had made his leader in valour and wickedness.
Some may wonder how it can happen that
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Agathocles, and his like, after infinite treach- eries and cruelties, should live for long secure in his country, and defend himself from external enemies, and never be conspired against by his own citizens; seeing that many others, by means of cruelty, have never been able even in peace- ful times to hold the state, still less in the doubt- ful times of war. I believe that this follows from severities ^ being badly or properly used. Those may be called properly used, if of evil it is lawful to speak well, that are apphed at one blow and are necessary to one's security, and that are not persisted in afterwards unless they can be turned to the advantage of the subjects. The badly employed are those which, notwith- standing they may be few in the commence- ment, multiply with time rather than decrease. Those who practise the first system are able, by aid of God or man, to mitigate in some degree their rule, as Agathocles did. It is impossible for those who follow the other to maintain themselves.
Hence it is to be remarked that, in seizing a state, the usurper ought to examine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary for him to inflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have to repeat them daily; and thus by not unsettling men he will be able to reassure them, and win them to himself by benefits. He who
* See Note.
A Principality Obtained 73
does otherwise, either from timidity or ev-il advice, is always compelled to keep the knife in his hand; neither can he rely on his subjects, nor can they attach themselves to him, owing to their continued and repeated wrongs. For injuries ought to be done all at one time, so that, being tasted less, they offend less; benefits ought to be given Uttle by httle, so that the flavour of them may last longer.
And above all things, a prince ought to live amongst his people in such a way that no unexpected circumstances, whether of good or evil, shall make him change; because if the necessity for this comes in troubled times, you are too late for harsh measures; and mild ones will not help you, for they will be considered as breed from you, and no one will be under any obhgation to you for them.
NINTH CHAPTER
CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPAUTY
{
NINTH CHAPTER
CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY
But coming to the other point — where a leading citizen becomes the prince of his country, not by wickedness or any intolerable violence, but by the favour of his fellow citizens — this may be called a civil principality: nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain to it, but rather a happy shrewdness. I say then that such a principahty is obtained either by the favour of the people or by the favour of the nobles. Because in all cities these two distinct parties are found, and from this it arises that the people do not wish to be ruled nor oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule and oppress the people; and from these two opposite desires there arises in cities one of three results, either a principality , self-government, or anarchy. A principality is created either by the people or by the nobles, accordingly as one or other of them has the opportunity; for the nobles, seeing they cannot wathstand the people, begin to cry up the reputation of one of themselves, and they make him a prince, so that under his
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shadow they can give vent to their ambitions. The people, finding they cannot resist the nobles, also cry up the reputation of one of themselves, and make him a prince so as to be defended by his authority. He who obtains sovereignty by the assistance of the nobles maintains him- self with more difficulty than he who comes to it by the aid of the people, because the former finds himself with many around him who con- sider themselves his equal, and because of this he can neither rule nor manage them to his liking. But he who reaches sovereignty by popular favour finds himself alone, and has none around him, or few, who are not piepared to obey him.
Besides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to others, satisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for their object is more righteous than that of the nobles, the latter wishing to oppress, whilst the former only desire not to be oppressed. It is to be added also that a prince can never secure himself against a hostile people, because of their being too many, whilst from the nobles he can secure himself, as they are few in number. The worst that a prince may expect from a hostile people is to be abandoned by them; but from hostile nobles he has not only to fear abandonment, but also that they will lise against him; for they, being m these affairs more far-seeing and astute,
A Civil Principality 79
always come forward in time to save themselves, and to obtain favours from him whom they expect to prevail. Further, the prince is com- pelled to Uve always with the same people, but he can do well without the same nobles, being able to make and unmake them daily, and to give or take away authority when it pleases him.
Therefore, to make this point clearer, I say that the nobles ought to be looked at mainly in two ways : that is to say, they either shape their course in such a way as binds them entirely to your fortune, or they do not. Those who so bind themselves, and are not rapacious, ought to be honoured and loved; those who do not bind themselves may be dealt with in two ways; they may fail to do this through pusillanimity and a natural want of courage, in which case you ought to make use of them, especially of those who are of good counsel; and thus, whilst in prosperity you honour yourself, in adversity you have not to fear them. But when for their own ambitious ends they shun binding them- selves, it is a token that they are giving more thought to themselves than to you, and a prince ought to guard against such, and to fear them as if they were open enemies, because in adver- sity they always help to ruin him.
Therefore, one who becomes a prince through the favour of the people ought to keep them
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friendly, and this he can easily do seeing they only ask not to be oppressed by him. But one who, in opposition to the people, becomes a prince by the favour of the nobles, ought, above everything, to seek to win the people over to himself, and this he may easily do if he takes them under his protection. Because men, when they receive good from him of whom they were expecting evil, are bound more closely to their benefactor; thus the people quickly be- come more devoted to him than if he had been raised to the principality by their favours; and the prince can win their affections in many ways, but as these vary according to the circum- stances one cannot give fixed rules, so I omit them; but, I repeat, it is necessary for a prince to have the people friendly, otherwise he has no security in adversity,
Nabis, Prince of the Spartans, sustained the attack of all Greece, and of a victorious Roman army, and against them he defended his country and his government ; and for the over- coming of this peril it was only necessary for him to make himself secure against a few, but this would not have been sufficient if the people had been hostile. And do not let any one im- pugn this statement with the trite proverb that, " He who builds on the people, builds on the mud," for this is true when a private citizen makes a foundation there, and persuades him-
A Civil Principality 8i
self that the people will free him when he is oppressed by his enemies or by the magistrates ; wherein he would find himself very often de- ceived, as happened to the Gracchi in Rome and to Messer Giorgio Scali in Florence. But granted a prince who has established himself as above, who can command, and is a man of courage, undismayed in adversity, who does not fail in other qualifications, and who, by his resolution and energy, keeps the whole people encouraged — such a one will never find himself deceived in them, and it will be shown that he has laid his foundations weU.
These principahties are hable to danger when they are passing from the civil to the absolute order of government, for such princes either rule personally or through magistrates. In the latter case their government is weaker and more insecure, because it rests entirely on the goodwill of those citizens who are raised to the magistracy, and who, especially in troubled times, can destroy the government with great ease, either by intrigue or open defiance; and the prince has not the chance amid tumults to exercise absolute authorit>% because the citizens and subjects, accustomed to receive orders from magistrates, are not of a mind to obey him amid these confusions, and there will always be in doubtful times a scarcity of men whom he can trust. For such a prince
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cannot rely upon what he observes in quiet times, when citizens have need of the state, because then every one agrees with him; they all promise, and when death is far distant they all wish to die for him; but in troubled times, when the state has need of its citizens, then he finds but few. And so much the more is this experiment dangerous, inasmuch as it can only be tried once. Therefore a wise prince ought to adopt such a course that his citizens will always in every sort and kind of circiun- stance have need of the state and of him, and then he will always find them faithful.
TENTH CHAPTER
CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH
OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO BE
MEASURED
TENTH CHAPTER
CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO BE MEASURED
It is necessary to consider another point in examining the character of these principahties : that is, whether a prince has such power that, in case of need, he can support himself with his own resources, or whether he has always need of the assistance of others. And so to make this quite clear I say that I consider those are able to support themselves by their own resources who can, either by abundance of men or money, raise a sufificient army to join battle against any one who comes to attack them ; and I con- sider those always to have need of others who cannot show themselves against the enemy in the field, but are forced to defend themselves by sheltering behind walls. The first case has been discussed, but we will speak of it again should it recur. In the second case one can say nothing except to encourage such princes to provision and fortify their towns, and not on any account to defend the country. And whoever shall fortify his town well, and shall have managed
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the other concerns of his subjects in the way stated above, and to be often repeated, will never be attacked without great caution, for men are always adverse to enterprises where difl6- culties can be seen, and it will be seen not to be an easy thing to attack one who has his town well fortified, and is not hated by his people.
The cities of Germany are absolutely free, they own but little country around them, and they yield obedience to the emperor when it suits them, nor do they fear this or any other power they may have near them, because they are fortified in such a way that every one thinks the taking of them by assault would be tedious and diflScult, seeing they have proper ditches and walls, they have sufficient artillery, and they always keep in pubUc depots enough for one year's eating, drinking, and firing. And beyond this, to keep the people quiet and without loss to the state, they always have the means of giving work to the community in those labours that are the Hfe and strength of the city, and on the pursuit of which the people are supported; they also hold military exercises in repute, and moreover have many ordinances to uphold them.
Therefore, a prince who has a strong city, and has not made himself odious, will not be at- tacked, or if any one should attack he wiD only be driven off with disgrace; again, because that
The Strength of Principalities 87
the affairs of this world are so changeable, it is almost impossible to keep an army a whole year in the field without being interfered with. And whoever should reply: if the people have property outside the city, and see it burnt, they will not remain patient, and the long siege and self-interest will make them forget their prince; to this I answer that a powerful and courageous prince will overcome all such difficulties by giving at one time hope to his subjects that the evil will not be for long, at another time fear of the cruelty of the enemy, then preserving him- self adroitly from those subjects who seem to him to be too bold.
Further, the enemy would naturally on his arrival at once bum and ruin the country at the time when the spirits of the people are still hot and ready for the defence ; and, therefore, so much the less ought the prince to hesitate; be- cause after a time, when spirits have cooled, the damage is already done, the ills are incurred, and there is no longer any remedy; and there- fore they are so much the more ready to unite with their prince, he appearing to be under obligations to them now that their houses have been burnt and their possessions mined in his defence. For it is the nature of men to be bound by the benefits they confer as much as by those they receive. Therefore, if everything is well
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considered, it will not be difficult for a wise prince to keep the minds of his citizens steadfast from first to last, when he does not fail to support and defend them.
ELEVENTH CHAPTER
CONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES
ELEVENTH CHAPTER
CONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES
It only remains now to speak of ecclesiastical principalities, touching which all difficulties are prior to getting possession, because they are ac- quired either by capacity or good fortune, and they can be held without either; for they are sus- tained by the ancient ordinances of religion, which are so all-powerful, and of such a character that the principalities may be held no matter how their princes behave and Hve. These princes alone have states and do not defend them, they have subjects and do not rule them; and the states, although unguarded, are not taken from them, and the subjects, although not ruled, do not care, and they have neither the desire nor the ability to aUenate themselves. Such princi- palities only are secure and happy. But being upheld by powers, to which the human mind cannot reach, I shall speak no more of them, be- cause, being exalted and maintained by God, it would be the act of a presumptuous and rash man to discuss them.
Nevertheless, if any one should ask of me how
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comes it that the Church has attained such great- ness in temporal power, seeing that from Alex- ander backwards the Italian potentates (not only those who have been called potentates, but every baron and lord, though the smallest) have valued the temporal power ver>' sUghtly — yet now a king of France trembles before it, and it has been able to drive him from Italy, and to ruin the Venetians — although this may be very manifest, it does not appear to me superfluous to recall it in some measure to memory.
Before Charles, King of France, passed into Italy, this country was under the dominion of the Pope, the Venetians, the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and the Florentines. These potentates had two principal anxieties: the one, that no foreigner should enter Italy under arms; the other, that none of themselves should seize more territory. Those about whom there was the most anxiety were the Pope and the Venetians. To restrain the Venetians the union of all the others was necessary, as it was for the defence of Ferrara; and to keep down the Pope they made use of the barons of Rome, who, being divided into two factions, Orsini and Colonnesi, had always a pretext for disorder, and, standing with arms in their hands under the eyes of the Pontiff, kept the pontificate weak and powerless. And although there might arise sometimes a courageous pope, such as Sixtus,
Ecclesiastical Principalities 93
yet neither fortune nor wisdom could rid him of these annoyances. And the short life of a pope is also a cause of weakness ; for in the ten years, which is the average Hfe of a pope, he can with difficulty lower one of the factions ; and if, so to speak, one pope should almost destroy the Colonnesi, another would arise hostile to the Orsini, who would support their opponents, and yet would not have time to ruin the Orsini. This was the reason why the temporal powers of the pope were httle esteemed in Italy.
Alexander the Sixth arose afterwards, who of all the pontiffs that have ever been showed how a pope with both money and arms was able to prevail; and through the instrumentality of the Duke Valentino, and by reason of the entry of the French, he brought about all those things which I have discussed above in the actions of the duke. And although his intention was not to aggrandise the Church, but the duke, never- theless, what he did contributed to the greatness of the Church, which, after his death and the ruin of the duke, became the heir to all his labours.
Pope Julius came afterwards and found the Church strong, possessing all the Romagna, the barons of Rome reduced to impotence, and, through the chastisements of Alexander, the factions wiped out ; he also found the way open to accumulate money in a manner such as had
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never been practised before Alexander's time. Such things Julius not only followed, but im- proved upon, and he intended to gain Bologna, to ruin the Venetians, and to drive the French out of Italy. All of these enterprises prospered with him, and so much the more to his credit, inasmuch as he did everything to strengthen the Church and not any private person. He kept also the Orsini and Colonnesi factions within the bounds in which he found them; and although there was among them some mind to make disturbance, nevertheless he held two things firm : the one, the greatness of the Church, -with which he terrified them; and the other, not allowing them to have their own cardinals, who cause the disorders among them. For whenever these factions have their cardinals they do not remain quiet for long, because cardinals foster the factions in Rome and out of it, and the barons are compelled to support them, and thus from the ambitions of prelates arise dis- orders and tumults among the barons. For these reasons his Holiness Pope Leo foimd the pontificate most powerful, and it is to be hoped that, if others made it great in arms, he will make it still greater and more venerated by his goodness and infinite other virtues.
TWELFTH CHAPTER
HOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERS ARE^ AND CONCERNING MERCENARIES
i:
TWELFTH CHAPTER
HOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERE ARE, ANI> CONCERNING MERCENARIES
Having discoursed particularly on the charac- teristics of such principahties as in the begin- ning I proposed to discuss, and having considered in some degree the causes of their being good or bad, and having shown the methods by which many have sought to acquire them and to hold them, it now remains for me to discuss generally the means of offence and defence which belong to each of them.
We have seen above how necessary it is for a prince to have his foundations well laid, other- wise it follows of necessity he will go to ruin. The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or composite, are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be good laws where the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are well armed they have good laws. I shall leave the laws out of the discussion and shall speak of the arms.
I say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince defends his state are either his own. or
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they are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed. Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for they are disunited, ambitious and without discipline, unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have neither the fear of God nor fideHty to men, and de- struction is deferred only so long as the attack is; for in peace one is robbed by them, and in war by the enemy. The fact is, they have no other attraction or reason for keeping the field than a trifle of stipend, which is not sufficient to make them willing to die for you. They are ready enough to be your soldiers whilst you do not make war, but if war comes they take them- selves off or run from the foe; which I should have little trouble to prove, for the ruin of Italy has been caused by nothing else than by resting all her hopes for many years on mercenaries, and although they formerly made some display and appeared valiant amongst themselves, yet when the foreigners came they showed what they were. Thus it was that Charles, King of France, was allowed to seize Italy with chalk in hand; ^ and he who told us that our sins were the cause of it told the truth, but they were not the sins he imagined, but those which I have related. And as they were the
> See Note.
Kinds of Soldiery 99
sins of princes, it is the princes who have also suffered the penalty.
I wish to demonstrate further the infelicity of these arms. The mercenary captains are either capable men or they are not; if they are, you cannot trust them, because they always aspire to their own greatness, either by oppressing you, who are their master, or others contrary to your intentions; but if the captain is not skilful, you are ruined in the usual way.
And if it be urged that whoever is armed will act in the same way, whether mercenary or not, I reply that when arms have to be resorted to, either by a prince or a repubhc, then the prince ought to go in person and perform the duty of captain; the repubhc has to send its citizens, and when one is sent who does not turn out satis- factorily, it ought to recall him, and when one is worthy, to hold him by the laws so that he does not leave the command. And experience has shown princes and repubhcs, single-handed, making the greatest progress, and mercenaries doing nothing except damage ; and it is more difficult to bring a repubhc, armed with its own arms, under the sway of one of its citizens than it is to bring one armed with foreign arms. Rome and Sparta stood for many ages armed and free. The Switzers are completely armed and quite free.
Of ancient mercenaries, for example, there are
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the Carthaginians, who were oppressed by their mercenary soldiers after the first war with the Romans, although the Carthaginians had their own citizens for captains. After the death of Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon was made captain of their soldiers by the Thebans, and after victory he took away their liberty.
Duke Filippo being dead, the Milanese enlisted Francesco Sforza against the Venetians, and he, having overcome the enemy at Caravaggio, allied himself with them to crush the Milanese, his masters. His father, Sforza, having been engaged by Queen Johanna of Naples, left her unprotected, so that she was forced to throw herself into the arms of the King of Aragon, in order to save her kingdom. And if the Vene- tians and Florentines formerly extended their dominions by these arms, and yet their cap- tains did not make themselves princes, but have defended them, I reply that the Florentines in this case have been favoured by chance, for of the able captains, of whom they might have stood in fear, some have not conquered, some have been opposed, and others have turned their ambitions elsewhere. One who did not conquer was Giovanni Acuto,^ and since he did not conquer his fidehty cannot be proved; but every one wiU acknowledge that, had he con- quered, the Florentines would have stood at
» See Note.
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his discretion. Sforza had the Bracceschi al- ways against him, so they watched each other. Francesco turned his ambition to Lombardy; Braccio against the Church and the kingdom of Naples. But let us come to that which happened a short while ago. The Florentines appointed as their captain Pagolo ViteUi, a most prudent man, who from a private position had risen to the greatest renown. If this man had taken Pisa, nobody can deny that it would have been proper for the Florentines to keep in with him, for if he became the soldier of their enemies they had no means of resisting, and if they held to him they must obey him. The Venetians, if their achievements are considered, will be seen to have acted safely and gloriously so long as they sent to war their own men, when with armed gentlemen and plebeians they did vali- antly. This was before they turned to enter- prises on land, but when they began to fight on land they forsook this virtue and followed the custom of Italy. And in the beginning of their expansion on land, through not having much territory, and because of their great reputation, they had not much to fear from their captains; but when they expanded, as imder Carmignuola, they had a taste of this mistake; for, having found him a most valiant man (they beat the Duke of Milan under his leadership) , and, on the other hand, knowing how lukewarm he was in
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the war, they feared they would no longer con- quer under him, and for this reason they were not willing, nor were they able, to let him go; and so, not to lose again that which they had acquired, they were compelled, in order to secure themselves, to murder him. They had afterwards for their captains Bartolomeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, the Count of Pitigliano, and the Uke, under whom they had to dread loss and not gain, as happened after- wards at Vaila, where in one battle they lost that which in eight hundred years they had acquired with so much trouble. Because from such arms conquests come but slowly, long delayed and inconsiderable, but the losses sudden and portentous.
And as with these examples I have reached Italy, which has been ruled for many years by mercenaries, I wish to discuss them more seri- ously, in order that, having seen their rise and progress, one may be better prepared to counter- act them. You must understand that the empire has recently come to be repudiated in Italy, that the Pope has acquired more temporal power, and that Italy has been divided up into more states, for the reason that many of the great cities took up arms against their nobles, who, formerly favoured by the emperor, were oppressing them, whilst the Church was favour- ing them so as to gain authority in temporal
Kinds of Soldiery 103
power: in many others their citizens became princes. From this it came to pass that Italy fell partly into the hands of the Church and of republics, and, the Church consisting of priests and the repubUc of citizens unaccustomed to arms, both commenced to enUst foreigners.
The first who gave renown to this soldiery was Alberigo da Conio, the Romagnian. From the school of this man sprang, among others, Braccio and Sforza, who in their time were the arbiters of Italy. After these came all the other captains who till now have directed the arms of Italy; and the end of all their valour has been, that she has been over-run by Charles, robbed by Louis, ravaged by Ferdinand, and in- sulted by the Switzers. The principle that has guided them has been, first, to lower the credit of infantry so that they might increase their own. They did this because, subsisting on their pay and without territory, they were unable to support many soldiers, and a few infantry did not give them any authority; so they were led to employ cavalry, with a moderate force of which they were maintained and honoured; and affairs were brought to such a pass that, in an army of twenty thousand soldiers, there were not to be found two thousand foot soldiers. They had, besides this, used every art to lessen fatigue and danger to themselves and their
soldiers, not killing in the fray, but taking
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prisoners and liberating without ransom. They did not attack towns at night, nor did the garri- sons of the towns attack encampments at night; they did not surround the camp either with stockade or ditch, nor did they campaign in the winter. All these things were permitted by their military rules, and devised by them to avoid, as I have said, both fatigue and dangers; thus they have brought Italy to slavery and contempt.
THIRTEENTH CHAPTER
CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE'S OWN
THIRTEENTH CHAPTER
CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND one's own
Auxiliaries, which are the other useless arm, are employed when a prince is called in with his forces to aid and defend, as was done by Pope Julius in the most recent times ; for he, having, in the enterprise against Ferrara, had poor proof of his mercenaries, turned to auxiUaries, and stipulated with Ferdinand, King of Spain, for his assistance with men and arms. These arms may be useful and good in themselves, but for him who calls them in they are always disad- vantageous; for losing, one is undone, and winning, one is their captive.
And although ancient histories may be full of examples, I do not wish to leave this recent one of Pope Julius the Second, the peril of which cannot fail to be perceived; for he, wishing to get Ferrara, threw himself entirely into the hands of the foreigner. But his good fortune brought about a third event, so that he did not reap the fruit of his rash choice ; because, having
his auxiliaries routed at Ravenna, and the
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Svvitzers having risen and driven out the con- querors (against all expectation, both his and others'), it so came to pass that he did not be- come prisoner to his enemies, they having fled, nor to his auxiharies, he having conquered by other arms than theirs.
The Florentines, being entirely without arms, sent ten thousand Frenchmen to take Pisa, whereby they ran more danger than at any other time of their troubles.
The Emperor of Constantinople, to oppose
his neighbours, sent ten thousand Turks into
Greece, who, on the war being finished, were not
,wiUing to quit; this was the beginning of the
servitude of Greece to the infidels.
Therefore, let him who has no desire to con- quer make use of these arms, for they are much more hazardous than mercenaries, because with them the ruin is ready made; they are all united, all 5^eld obedience to others; but with mercenaries, when they have conquered, more time and better opportunities are needed to in- jure you; they are not all of one community, they are found and paid by you, and a third party, which you have made their head, is not able all at once to assume enough authority to injure you. In conclusion, in mercenaries dastardy is most dangerous; in auxiharies, valour. The wise prince, therefore, has always avoided these arms and turned to his own; and
Auxiliaries and Mixed Soldiery 109
has been wiUing rather to lose with them than to conquer with others, not deeming that a real victory which is gained with the arms of others.
I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. This duke entered the Romagna with auxiliaries, taking there only French soldiers, and with them he captured Imola and Forli; but afterwards, such forces not appearing to him rehable, he turned to mercenaries, discerning less danger in them, and enlisted the Orsini and Vitelli; whom presently, on handUng and finding them doubt- ful, unfaithful, and dangerous, he destroyed and turned to his own men. And the difference between one and the other of these forces can easily be seen when one considers the difference there was in the reputation of the duke, when he had the French, when he had the Orsini and Vitelli, and when he relied on his own soldiers, on whose fidelity he could always count and found it ever increasing ; he was never esteemed more highly than when every one saw that he was complete master of his own forces.
I was not intending to go beyond Itahan and recent examples, but I am unwilling to leave out Hiero, the Syracusan, he being one of those I have named above. This man, as I have said, made head of the army by the Syracusans, soon found out that a mercenary soldiery, consti- tuted like our Italian condottieri, was of no use ;
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and it appearing to him that he could neither keep them nor let them go, he had them all cut to pieces, and afterwards made war with his own forces and not with aliens.
I wish also to recall to memory an instance from the Old Testament applicable to this sub- ject. David offered himself to Saul to fight with Goliath, the Philistine champion, and, to give him courage, Saul armed him with his own weapons; which David rejected as soon as he had them on his back, saying he could make no use of them, and that he wished to meet the enemy with his shng and his knife. In conclu- sion, the arms of others either fall from your back, or they weigh you down, or they bind you fast.
Charles the Seventh, the father of King Louis the Eleventh, having by good fortune and valour liberated France from the Enghsh, recognised the necessity of being armed with forces of his own, and he established in his kingdom ordinances concerning men-at-arms and infan- try. Afterwards his son. King Louis, aboUshed the infantry and began to enUst the Switzers, which mistake, followed by others, is, as is now seen, a source of peril to that kingdom; because, having raised the reputation of the Switzers, he has entirely diminished the value of his own arms, for he has destroyed the in- fantry altogether; and his men-at-arms he has
Auxiliaries and Mixed Soldiery 1 1 1
subordinated to others, for, being as they are so accustomed to fight along with Switzers, it does not appear that they can now conquer without them. Hence it arises that the French cannot stand against the Switzers, and without the Switzers they do not come off well against others. The armies of the French have thus become mixed, partly mercenary and partly national, both of which arms together are much better than mercenaries alone or auxiliaries alone, yet much inferior to one's own forces. And this example proves it, for the kingdom of France would be unconquerable if the ordin- ance of Charles had been enlarged or maintained.
But the scanty wisdom of man, on entering into an affair which looks well at first, cannot discern the poison that is hidden in it, as I have said above of hectic fevers. Therefore, if he who rules a principality cannot recognise evils until they are upon him, he is not truly wise; and this insight is given to few. And if the first disaster to the Roman Empire should be examined, it will be found to have commenced only with the enlisting of the Goths; because from that time the vigour of the Roman Empire began to decline, and all that valour which had raised it passed away to others.
I conclude, therefore, that no principality is
secure without having its own forces; on the
contrary', it is entirely dependent on good for- *£ 280
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tune, not having the valour which in adversity would defend it. And it has always been the opinion and judgment of wise men that nothing can be so uncertain or unstable as fame or power not founded on its own strength. And one's own forces are those which are composed either of subjects, citizens, or dependents ; all others are mercenaries or auxiliaries. And the way to make ready one's own forces will be easily found if the rules suggested by me shall be reflected upon, and if one will consider how Philip, the father of Alexander the Great, and many republics and princes have armed and organised themselves, to which rules I entirely commit myself.
I
FOURTEENTH CHAPTER
THAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE ART OF WAR
FOURTEENTH CHAPTER
THAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE ART OF WAR
A PRINCE ought to have no other aim or thought^ nor select anything else for his study, than war and its rules and discipline ; for this is the sole art that belongs to him who rules, and it is of such force that it not only upholds those who are born princes, but it often enables men to rise from a private station to that rank. And, on the contrary, it is seen that when princes have thought more of ease than of arms they have lost their states. And the first cause of your losing it is to neglect this art; and what enables you to acquire a state is to be master of the art. Francesco Sforza, through being martial, from a private person became Duke of Milan; and the sons, through avoiding the hardships and troubles of arms, from dukes became private persons. For among other evils which being unarmed brings you, it causes you to be despised, and this is one of those ig- nominies against which a prince ought to guard himself, as is shown later on. Because there is
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nothing proportionate between the armed and the unarmed; and it is not reasonable that he who is armed should 5deld obedience wiUingly to him who is unarmed, or that the unarmed man should be secure among armed servants. Because, there being in the one disdain and in the other suspicion, it is not possible for them to work well together. And therefore a prince who does not understand the art of war, over and above the other misfortunes already men- tioned, cannot be respected by his soldiers, nor can he rely on them. He ought never, there- fore, to have out of his thoughts this subject of war, and in peace he should addict himself more to its exercise than in war; this he can do in two ways, the one by action, the other by study.
As regards action, he ought above all things to keep his men well organised and drilled, to follow incessantly the chase, by which he accustoms his body to hardships, and learns something of the nature of locaUties, and gets to find out how the mountains rise, how the valleys open out, how the plains he, and to understand the nature of rivers and marshes, and in all this to take the greatest care. Which knowledge is useful in two ways. Firstly, he learns to know his country, and is better able to undertake its defence ; afterwards, by means of the knowledge and observation of that locahty, he under-
The Art of War 1 1 7
stands with ease any other which it may be necessary for him to study hereafter; because the hills, valleys, and plains, and rivers and marshes that are, for instance, in Tuscany, have a certain resemblance to those of other countries, so that with a knowledge of the aspect of one country one can easily arrive at a knowledge of others. And the prince that lacks this skill lacks the essential which it is desirable that a captain should possess, for it teaches him to surprise his enemy, to select quarters, to lead armies, to array the battle, to besiege towns to advantage.
Philopoemen, Prince of the Acheans, among other praises which writers have bestowed on him, is commended because in time of peace he never had anything in his mind but the rules of war; and when he was in the country with friends, he often stopped and reasoned ^vith them: " If the enemy should be upon that hiU, and we should find ourselves here with our army, with whom would be the advantage? How should one best advance to meet him, keeping the ranks? If we should wish to retreat, how ought we to set about it? If they should re- treat, how ought we to pursue ? " And he would set forth to them, as he went, all the chances that could befaU an army; he would hsten to their opinion and state his, confirming it with reasons, so that by these continual discussions
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there could never arise, in time of war, any unexpected circumstances that he could not deal with.
But to exercise the intellect the prince should read histories, and study there the actions of illustrious men, to see how they have borne themselves in war, to examine the causes of their victories and defeat, so as to avoid the latter and imitate the former; and above all do as an illustrious man did, who took as an exem- plar one who had been praised and famous before him, and whose achievements and deeds he always kept in his mind, as it is said Alexander the Great imitated Achilles, Caesar Alexander, Scipio Cyrus. And whoever reads the hfe of Cjniis, written by Xenophon, wiU recognise after- wards in the life of Scipio how that imitation was his glory, and how in chastity, affability, humanity, and liberaUty Scipio conformed to those things which have been written of Cyrus by Xenophon. A wise prince ought to observe some such rules, and never in peaceful times stand idle, but increase his resources with industry in such a way that they may be avail- able to him in adversity, so that if fortune changes it may find him prepared to resist her blows.
FIFPEENTH CHAPTER
CONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND
ESPECIALLY PRINCES. ARE PRAISED
OR BLAMED
FIFTEENTH CHAPTER
CONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES, ARE PRAISED OR BLAMED
It remains now to see what ought to be the rules of conduct for a prince towards subject and friends. And as I know that many have written on this point, I expect I shall be con- sidered presimiptuous in mentioning it again, especially as in discussing it I shaU depart from the methods of other people. But, it being my intention to write a thing which shall be useful to him who apprehends it, it app)ears to me more appropriate to foUow up the real truth of a matter than the imagination of it; for many have pictured repubhcs and principahties which in fact have never been known or seen, because how one Hves is so far distant from how one ought to hve, that he who neglects what is done for what ought to be done, sooner effects his ruin than his preservation; for a man who wishes to act entirely up to his professions of virtue soon meets with what destroys him among so much that is evil.
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Hence it is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own to know how to do wrong, and to make use of it or not according to necessity. Therefore, putting on one side imaginary- things concerning a prince, and discussing those which are real, I say that all men when they are spoken of, and chiefly princes for being more highly placed, are remarkable for some of those quali- ties which bring them either blame or praise; and thus it is that one is reputed hberal, another miserly, using a Tuscan term (because an avari- cious person in our language is still he who desires to possess by robbery, whilst we call one miserly who deprives himself too much of the use of his own) ; one is reputed generous, one rapacious ; one cruel, one compassionate ; one faithless, another faithful; one effeminate and cowardly, another bold and brave; one affable, another haughty; one lascivious, another chaste; one sincere, another cunning; one hard, another easy; one grave, another frivolous; one rehgious, another unbeheving, and the Uke. And I know that every one will confess that it would be most praiseworthy in a prince to exhibit all the above quahties that are con- sidered good; but because they can neither be entirely possessed nor observed, for human con- ditions do not permit it, it is necessary for him to be sufficiently prudent that he may know how to avoid the reproach of those vices which
Concerning Praise or Blame 123
would lose him his state; and also to keep him- self, if it be possible, from those which would not lose him it; but this not being possible, he may with less hesitation abandon himself to them. And again, he need not make himself uneasy at incurring a reproach for those vices without which the state can only be saved with difficulty, for if everything is considered care- fully, it will be found that something which looks hke virtue, if followed, would be his ruin; whilst something else, which looks hke vice, yet followed brings him security and prosperity.
SIXTEENTH CHAPTER
CONCERNING LIBERALITY OR MEANNESS
SIXTEENTH CHAPTER
CONCERNING LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS
Commencing then with the first of the above- named characteristics, I sav that it would be well to be reputed hberal. Nevertheless, liberality exercised in a way that does not brinjg; you the reputation for it, injures you ; for if one exercises it honestly and as it should be exer- cised, it may not become known, and you will not avoid the reproach of its opposite. There- fore, any one wishing to maintain among men the name of liberal is obliged to avoid no attri- bute of magnificence; so that a prince thus inclined will consume in such acts all his pro- perty, and will be compelled in the end, if he wish to maintain the name of Hberal, to unduly weigh down his people, and tax them, and do everything he can to get money. This will soon make him odious to his subjects, and becoming poor he will be httle valued by any one; thus, with his hberahty, having offended many and rewarded few, he is affected by the very first trouble and imperilled by whatever may be
the first danger; recognising this himself, and
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wishing to draw back from it, he runs at once into the reproach of being miserly.
Therefore, a prince, not being able to exercise this virtue of liberaUty in such a way that it is recognised, except to his cost, if he is wise he ought not to fear the reputation of being mean, for in time he will come to be more considered than if Uberal, seeing that with his economy his revenues are enough, that he can defend him- self against all attacks, and is able to engage in enterprises without burdening his people; thus it comes to pass that he exercises liberaUty towards all from whom he does not take, who are munberless, and meanness towards those to whom he does not give, who are few.
We have not seen great things done in our time except by those who have been considered mean; the rest have failed. Pope Julius the Second was assisted in reaching the papacy by a reputation for liberality, yet he did not strive afterwards to keep it up, when he made war on the King of France; and he made many wars without imposing any extraordinary tax on his subjects, for he supplied his additional expenses out of his long thriftiness. The present King of Spain would not have undertaken or con- quered in so many enterprises if he had been re- puted liberal. A prince, therefore, provided that he has not to rob his subjects, that he can de- fend himself, that he does not become poor and
Liberality and Meanness 129
abject, that he is not forced to become rapacious, ought to hold of little account a reputation for being mean, for it is one of those vices which will enable him to govern.
And if any one should say: Caesar obtained empire by liberality, and many others have reached the highest positions by having been Uberal, and by being considered so, I answer: Either you are a prince in fact, or in a way to become one. In the first case this Hberahty is dangerous, in the second it is very necessary to be considered liberal; and Caesar was one of those who wished to become pre-eminent in Rome; but if he had survived after becoming so, and had not moderated his expenses, he would have destroyed his government. And if any one should reply : Many have been princes, and have done great things with armies, who have been considered very Hberal, I reply: Either a prince spends that which is his own or his subjects' or else that of others. In the first case he ought to be sparing, in the second he ought not to neglect any opportunity for liber- ality. And to the prince who goes forth with his army, supporting it by piUage, sack, and extortion, handhng that which belongs to others, this hberahty is necessary, otherwise he would not be followed by soldiers. And of that which is neither yours nor your subjects' you can be a ready giver, as were Cyrus, Caesar, and
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Alexander; because it does not take away your reputation if you squander that of others, but adds to it ; it is only squandering your own that injures you.
And there is nothing wastes so rapidly as liberality, for even whilst you exercise it you lose the power to do so, and so become either poor or despised, or else, in avoiding poverty, rapacious and hated. And a prince should guard himself, above all things, against being despised and hated; and liberaHty leads you to both. Therefore it is wiser to have a reputa- tion for meanness which brings reproach without hatred, than to be compelled through seeking a reputation for liberahty to incur a name for rapacity which begets reproach with hatred.
SEVENTEENTH CHAFFER
CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND
WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED
THAN FEARED
SEVENTEENTH CHAPTER
CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED THAN FEARED
Coming now to the other qualities mentioned above, I say that every prince ought to desire to be considered clement and not crud. Never- theless he ought to take care not to misuse this^clemency. Cesare Borgia was considered cruel; notwithstanding, his cruelty reconciled the Romagna, unified it, and restored it to peace and loyalty. And if this be rightly considered, he will be seen to have been much more merci- ful than the Florentine people, who, to avoid a reputation for cruelty, permitted Pistoia to be destroyed. Therefore a prince, so long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal, ought not to mind the reproach of cruelty; because with a few examples he will be more merciful than those who, through too much mercy, allow dis- orders to arise, from which follow murder or robbery; for these are wont to injure the whole people, whilst those executions which originate with a prince offend the individual only.
^33
134 The Prince
And of all princes, it is impossible for the new prince to avoid the imputation of cruelty, OM^ang to new states being full of dangers. Hence Virgil, through the mouth of Dido, excuses the inhumanity of her reign owing to its being new, saymg:—
" Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt Moliri, et late fines custode tueri."
Nevertheless he ought to be slow to believe and to act, nor should he himself show fear, but pro- ceed in a temperate manner with prudence and humanity, so that too much confidence may not make him incautious and too much distrust render him intolerable. A" Upon__this a question arises: whether it bg better to be loved than feared or feared than loved? It may be answered that one should wish to be both, but, because it is difficult to unite them in one person, it is much safer to be feared than loved, when, of the two, either must be dispensed with. Because this is to be as- serted in general of men, that they are ungrate- ful, fickle, false, cowards, covetous, and as long as you succeed they are yours entirely ; they will offer you their blood, property, hfe, and children, as is said above, when the need is far distant; but when it approaches they turn against__you. And that prince who, relying entirely on their promises, has neglected other
Cruelty and Clemency 135
precautions, is ruined; because friendships that are obtained by pa5m[ients, and not by greatness or nobility of mind, may indeed be earned, but they are not secured, and in time of need cannot be relied upon; and men have less scruple in offending one who is beloved than one who is feared, for love is preserved bv the link (^ obhgation which, owing to the baseness of men, is broken at every opportunity for their advan- tage; but fear preserves you by a dread of punishment which never fails.
Nevertheless a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that, if he does not win love, he avoids hatred; because he can endure very well being feared whilst he is not hated, which will always be as long as he abstains from the pro- perty of his citizens and subjects and from their women. But when it is necessary for him to proceed against the life of some one, he must do it on proper justification and for manifest cause, but above aU things he must keep his hands off the property of others, because men more quickly forget the death of their father than the loss of their patrimony. Besides, pretexts for taking away the property are never wanting ; for he who has once begim to live by robbery wiU always find pretexts for seizing what belongs to others; but reasons for taking life, on the contrary, are more difficult to find and sooner lapse. But when a prince is with his army, and
I 36 The Prince
has under control a multitude of soldiers, then it is quite necessary for him to disregard the re- putation of cruelty, for without it he would never hold his army united or disposed to its duties.
Among the wonderful deeds of Hannibal this one is enumerated : that having led an enorm.ous army, composed of many various races of men, to fight in foreign lands, no dissensions arose either among them or against the prince, whether in his bad or in his good fortune. This arose from nothing else than his inhuman cruelty, which, with his boundless valour, made him revered and terrible in the sight of his soldiers, but without that cruelty, his other virtues were not sufficient to produce this effect. And short-sighted writers admire his deeds from one point of view and from another condemn the principal cause of them. That it is true his other virtues would not have been sufficient for him may be proved by the case of Scipio, that most excellent man, not only of his own times but within the memory of man, against whom, nevertheless, his army rebelled in Spain; this arose from nothing but his too great forbear- ance, which gave his soldiers more hcence than is consistent with military discipline. For this he was upbraided in the Senate by Fabius Maximus, and called the corruptor of the Roman soldiery. The Locrians were laid waste by a legate of
Cruelty and Clemency 137
Scipio, yet they were not avenged by him, nor was the insolence of the legate punished, owing entirely to his easy nature. Insomuch that some one in the Senate, wishing to excuse him, said there were many men who knew much better how not to err than to correct the errors of others. This disposition, if he had been con- tinued in the command, would have destroyed in time the fame and glory of Scipio ; but, he being under the control of the Senate, this injurious characteristic not only concealed itself, but contributed to his glory.
Returning to the question of being feared or loved, I come to the conclusion that, men loving according to their own will and feanng accord- ing to that of the prince, a wise prince should estabUsh himself on that which is in his own control and not in that of others; he must endeavour only to avoid hatred, as is noted.
EIGHTEENTH CHAPTER
CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES SHOULD KEEP FAITH
EIGHTEENTH CHAPTER
CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES SHOULD KEEP FAITH
Every one admits how praiseworthy it is in a prince to keep faith, and to live with integrity and not with craft. Nevertheless our experi- ence has been that those princes who have done great things have held good faith of little ac- count, and have known how to circumvent the intellect of men by craft, and in the end have overcome those who have relied on their word. You must know there are two ways of contest- ing, the one by the law, the other by force ; ^ the first method is proper to men, the second to beasts; but because the first is frequently not sufficient, it is necessary to have recourse to the second. Therefore it is necessary for a prince to understand how to avail himself of the beast and the man. This has been figuratively taught to princes by ancient writers, who describe how AchiUes and many other princes of old were given to the Centaur Chiron to nurse, who brought them up in his discipHne; which means
^ See Note. 141
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solely that, as they had for a teacher one who was half beast and half man, so it is necessary for a prince to know how to make use of both natures, and that one without the other is not durable. A prince, therefore, being compelled knowingly to adopt the beast, ought to choose the fox and the lion; because the lion cannot defend himself against snares and the fox cannot defend himself against wolves. There- fore, it is necessary to be a fox to discover the snares and a lion to terrify the wolves. Those who rely simply on the lion do not understand what they are about. Therefore a wise lord cannot, nor ought he to, keep faith when such observance may be turned against him, and when the reasons that caused him to pledge it exist no longer. If men were entirely good this precept would not hold, but because they are bad, and will not keep faith with you, you too are not bound to observe it with them. Nor will there ever be wanting to a prince legiti mate reasons to excuse this non-observance. Of this endless modem examples could be given, showing how many treaties and engagements have been made void and of no effect through the faithlessness of princes; and he who has known best how to employ the fox has suc- ceeded best.
But it is necessary to know well how to disguise this characteristic, and to be a great
The Way Princes Should Keep Faith 143
pretender and dissembler; and men are so simple, and so subject to present necessities, that he who seeks to deceive will always find some one who will allow himself to be deceived. One recent example I cannot pass over in silence. Alexander the Sixth did nothing else but de- ceive men, nor ever thought of doing otherwise, and he always found victims; for there never was a man who had greater power m asserting, or who with greater oaths would affirm a thing, yet would observe it less; nevertheless his de- ceits always succeeded according to his wishes,^ because he well understood this side of mankind.
Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities I have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to have them. And I shall dare to say this also, that to have them and always to observe them is injurious, and that to appear to have them is useful; to appear merciful, faithful, humane, religious, up- right, and to be so, but with a mind so framed that should you require not to be so, you may be able and know how to change to the opposite.
And you have to understand this, that a prince, especially a new one, cannot observe all those things for which men are esteemed, being often forced, in order to maintain the state, to act contrary to fidelity,^ friendship, humanity, and religion. Therefore it is necessary for him
' See Note.
*p 280
144 The Prince
to have a mind ready to turn itself accordingly as the winds and variations of fortune force it, yet, as I have said above, not to diverge from the good if he can avoid doing so, but, if com- pelled, then to know how to set about it.
For this reason a prince ought to take care that he never lets anything shp from his hps that is not replete with the above-named five quahties, that he may appear to him who sees and hears him altogether merciful, faithful,^ humane, upright, and rehgious. There is nothing more necessary to appear to have than this last quality, inasmuch as men judge generally more by the eye than by the hand, because it belongs to everybody to see you, to few to come in touch with you. Every one sees what you appear to be, few really know what you are, and those few dare not oppose themselves to the opinion of the many, who have the majesty of the state to defend them; and in the actions of all men, and especially of princes, which it is not prudent to challenge, one judges by the result.
For that reason, let a prince have the credit of conquering and holding his state, the means will always be considered honest, and he will be praised by everybody; because the vulgar are always taken by what a thing seems to be and by what comes of it ; and in the world there are only the vulgar, for the few nnd a place
» Seo Note.
The Way Princes Should Keep Faith 1 45
there only when the many have no ground to rest on.
One prince of the present time, whom it is not well to name, never preaches anything else but peace and good faith, and to both he is most hostile, and either, if he had kept it, would have deprived him of reputation and kingdom many a time.
NINETEENTH CHAPTER
THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED
NINETEENTH CHAPTER
THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED
Now, concerning the characteristics of which mention is made above, I have spoken of the more important ones, the others I wish to dis- cuss briefly under this generality, that the prince must consider, as has been in part said before, how to avoid those things which wiU make him hated or contemptible; and as often as he shall have succeeded he will have fulfilled his part, and he need not fear any danger in other reproaches.
It makes him hated above all things, as I have said, to be rapacious, and to be a violator of the property and women of his subjects, from both of which he must abstain. And when neither their property nor honour is touched, the majority of men live content, and he has only to contend with the ambition of a few, whom he can curb with ease in many ways.
It makes him contemptible to be considered fickle, frivolous, effeminate, mean-spirited, ir- resolute, from all of which a prince should guard
149
150 The Prince
himself as from a rock ; and he should endeavour to show in his actions greatness, courage, gravity, and fortitude; and in his private dealings with his subjects let him show that his judgments are irrevocable, and maintain himself in such re- putation that no one can hope either to deceive him or to get round him.
That prince is highly esteemed who conveys this impression of himself, and he who is highly esteemed is not easily conspired against; for, provided it is well known that he is an excellent man and revered by his people, he can only be attacked with difficulty. For this reason a prince ought to have two fears, one from within, on account of his subjects, the other from with- out, on account of external powers. From the latter he is defended by being well armed and having good allies, and if he is well armed he will have good friends, and affairs will always remain quiet within when they are quiet with- out, imless they should have been ab^eady dis- turbed by conspiracy; and even should affairs outside be disturbed, if he has carried out his preparations and has lived as I have said, as long as he does not despair, he will resist every attack, as I said Nabis the Spartan did.
But concerning his subjects, when affairs out- side are disturbed he has only to fear that they will conspire secretly, from which a prince can easily secure himself by avoiding being hated
Despised and Hated 151
and despised, and by keeping the people satis- fied with him, which it is most necessary foi him to accomphsh, as I said above at length. And one of the most efficacious remedies that a prince can have against conspiracies is not to be hated and despised by the people, for he who conspires against a prince always expects to please them by his removal; but when the con- spirator can only look forward to offending them, he will not have the courage to take such a course, for the difficulties that confront a con- spirator are infinite. And as experience shows, many have been the conspiracies, but few have been successful; because he who conspires cannot act alone, nor can he take a companion except from those whom he believes to be mal- contents, and as soon as you have opened your mind to a malcontent you have given him the material with which to content himself, for by denouncing you he can look for every advan- tage; so that, seeing the gain from this course to be assured, and seeing the other to be doubt- ful and full of dangers, he must be a very rare friend, or a thoroughly obstinate enemy of the prince, to keep faith with you.
And, to reduce the matter into a small com- pass, I say that, on the side of the conspirator, there is nothing but fear, jealousy, prospect of punishment to terrify him; but on the side of the prince there is the majesty of the princi-
152 The Prince
pality, the laws, the protection of friends and the state to defend him; so that, adding to all these things the popular goodwill, it is impos- sible that any one should be so rash as to con- spire. For whereas in general the conspirator has to fear before the execution of his plot, in this case he has also to fear the sequel to the crime ; because on account of it he has the people for an enemy, and thus cannot hope for any escape.
Endless examples could be given on this sub- ject, but I will be content with one, brought to pass within the memory of our fathers. Messer Annibale BentivogH, who was prince in Bologna (grandfather of the present Annibale), having been murdered by the Canneschi, who had conspired against him, not one of his family survived but Messer Giovanni, who was in childhood: immediately after his assassination the people rose and murdered all the Canneschi. This sprung from the popular goodwill which the house of Bentivogli enjoyed in those days in Bologna; which was so great that, although none remained there after the death of Anni- bale who were able to rule the state, the Bolog- nese, having information that there was one of the Bentivogli family in Florence, who up to that time had been considered the son of a blacksmith, sent to Florence for him and gave him the government of their city, and it was
Despised and Hated 153
ruled by him until Messer Giovanni came in due course to the government.
For this reason I consider that a prince ought to reckon conspiracies of Httle account when his people hold him in esteem ; but when it is hostile to him, and bears hatred towards him, he ought to fear everything and everybody. And well- ordered states and wise princes have taken every care not to drive the nobles to despera- tion, and to keep the people satisfied and con- tented, for this is one of the most important objects a prince can have.
Among the best ordered and governed king- doms of our times is France, and in it are found many good institutions on which depend the liberty and security of the king; of these the first is the parliament and its authority, because he who founded the kingdom, knowing the ambition of the nobility and their boldness, considered that a bit in their mouths would be necessary to hold them in ; and, on the other side, knowing the hatred of the people, founded in fear, against the nobles, he wished to protect them, yet he was not anxious for this to be the] particular care of the king; therefore, to take away the reproach which he would be liable to from the nobles for favouring the people, and from the people for favouring the nobles, he set up an arbiter, who should be one who could beat down the great and favour the lesser
154 The Prince
without reproach to the king. Neither could you have a better or a more prudent arrangement, or a greater source of security to the king and king- dom. From this one can draw another im- portant conclusion, that princes ought to leave affairs of reproach to the management of others, and keep those of grace in their own hands. And further, I consider that a prince ought to cherish the nobles, but not so as to make himself hated by the people.
It may appear, perhaps, to some who have examined the lives and deaths of the Roman emperors that many of them would be an example contrary to my opinion, seeing that some of them lived nobly and showed great qualities of soul, nevertheless they have lost their empire or have been killed by subjects who have conspired against them. Wishing, therefore, to answer these objections, I will re- call the characters of some of the emperors, and will show that the causes of their ruin were not different to those alleged by me; at the same time I will only submit for consideration those things that are noteworthy to him who studies the affairs of those times.
It seems to me sufficient to take all those emperors who succeeded to the empire from Marcus the philosopher down to Maximinus; they were Marcus and his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julius, Sevenis and his son Antoninus
Despised and Hated 155
Caracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus.
There is first to note that, whereas in other principaHties the ambition of the nobles and the insolence of the people only have to be con- tended with, the Roman emperors had a third difficulty in having to put up with the cruelty and avarice of their soldiers, a matter so beset with difficulties that it was the ruin of many; for it was a hard thing to give satisfaction both to soldiers and people; because the people loved peace, and for this reason they loved the unaspiring prince, whilst the soldiers loved the warhke prince who was bold, cruel, and rapa- cious, which qualities they were quite willing he should exercise upon the people, so that they could get double pay and give vent to their greed and cruelty. Hence it arose that those emperors were always overthrown who, either by birth or training, had no great authority, and most of them, especially those who came new to the principaUty, recognising the difficulty of these two opposing humours, were incUned to give satisfaction to the soldiers, caring little about injuring the people. Which course was necessary, because, as princes cannot help being hated by some one, they ought, in the first place, to avoid being hated by every one, and when they cannot compass this, they ought to en- deavour with the utmost diligence to avoid the
I 56 The Prince
hatred of the most powerful. Therefore, those emperors who through inexperience had need of special favour adhered more readily to the soldiers than to the people; a course which turned out advantageous to them or not, ac- cordingly as the prince knew how to maintain authority over them.
From these causes it arose that Marcus, Per- tinax, and Alexander, being all men of modest life, lovers of justice, enemies to cruelty, humane, and benignant, came to a sad end except Mar- cus; he alone lived and died honoured, because he had succeeded to the throne by hereditary title, and owed nothing either to the soldiers or the people; and afterwards, being possessed of many virtues which made him respected, he always kept both orders in their places whilst he lived, and was neither hated nor despised.
But Pertinax was created emperor against the wishes of the soldiers, who, being accus- tomed to Uve Ucentiously under Commodus, could not endure the honest Ufe to which Per- tinax wished to reduce them; thus, having given cause for hatred, to which hatred there was added contempt for his old age, he was over- thrown at the very beginning of his administra- tion. And here it should be noted that hatred is acquired as much by good works as by bad ones, therefore, as I said before, a prince wishing to keep his state is very often forced to do evil ;
Despised and Hated 157
for when that body is corrupt whom you think you have need of to maintain yourself — it may be either the people or the soldiers or the nobles — you have to submit to its humours and to gratify them, and then good works will do you harm.
But let us come to Alexander, who was a man of such great goodness, that among the other praises which are accorded him is this, that in the fourteen years he held the empire no one was ever put to death by him unjudged; never- theless, being considered effeminate and a man who allowed himself to be governed by his mother, he became despised, the army con- spired against him, and murdered him.
Turning now to the opposite characters of Commodus, Severus, Antoninus Caracalla, and Maximinus, you will find them all cruel and rapacious — men who, to satisfy their soldiers, did not hesitate to commit every kind of iniquity against the people ; and all, except Severus, came to a bad end; but in Severus there was so much valour that, keeping the soldiers friendly, although the people were oppressed by him, he reigned successfully; for his valour made him so much admired in the sight of the soldiers and people that the latter were kept in a way astonished and awed and the former respectful and satisfied. And because the actions of this man, as a new prince, were great, I \vish to show
158 The Prince
briefly that he knew well how to counterfeit the fox and the lion, which natures, as I said above, it is necessary for a prince to imitate.
Knowing the sloth of the Emperor JuHan, he persuaded the army in Sclavonia, of which he was captain, that it would be right to go to Rome and avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been killed by the Pretorian soldiers ; and under this pretext, without appearing to aspire to the throne, he moved the army on Rome, and reached Italy before it was kno^vn that he had started. On his arrival at Rome, the Senate, through fear, elected him emperor and killed Julian. After this there remained for Severus, who wished to make himself master of the whole empire, two difficulties; one in Asia, where Niger, head of the Asiatic army, had caused himself to be proclaimed emperor; the other in the West where Albinus was, who also aspired to the throne. And as he considered it dangerous to declare himself hostile to both, he decided to attack Niger and to deceive Albinus. To the latter he wrote that, being elected emperor by the Senate, he was willing to share that dignity with him and sent him the title of Caesar; and, moreover, that the Senate had made Albinus his colleague; which things were accepted by Albinus as true. But after Severus had conquered and killed Niger, and settled Oriental affairs, he returned to Rome and com-
Despised and Hated 159
plained to the Senate that Albinus, httle recog- nising the benefits that he had received from him, had by treachery sought to murder him, and for this ingratitude he was compelled to punish him. Afterwards he sought him out in France, and took from him his government and Hfe. He who will, therefore, carefully examine the actions of this man will find him a most vahant lion and a most cunning fox; he will find him feared and respected by every one, and not hated by the army; and it need not be wondered at that he, a new man, was able to hold the empire so well, because his supreme renown always protected him from that hatred which the people might have conceived against him for his violence.
But his son Antoninus was a most eminent man, and had very excellent qualities, which made him admirable in the sight of the people and acceptable to the soldiers, for he was a war- hke man, most enduring of fatigue, a despiser of all delicate food and other luxuries, which caused him to be beloved by the armies. Never- theless, his ferocity and cruelties were so great and so unheard of that, after endless single murders, he killed a large number of the people of Rome and all those of Alexandria. He be- came hated by the whole world, and also feared by those he had around him, to such an extent that he was murdered in the midst of his army
i6o The Prince
by a centurion. And here it must be noted that such hke deaths, which are dehberately inflicted with a resolved and desperate courage, cannot be avoided by princes, because any one who does not fear to die can inflict them; but a prince may fear them the less because they are very rare ; he has only to be careful not to do any grave injury to those whom he employs or has around him in the service of the state. Antoninus had not taken this care, but had contumeliously killed a brother of that cen- turion, whom also he daily threatened, yet retained in his bodyguard; which, as it turned out, was a rash thing to do, and proved the emperor's ruin.
But let us come to Commodus, to whom it should have been very easy to hold the empire, for, being the son of Marcus, he had inherited it, and he had only to follow in the footsteps of his father to please his people and soldiers; but, being by nature cruel and brutal, he gave him- self up to amusing the soldiers and corrupting them, so that he might indulge his rapacity upon the people; on the other hand, not maintaining his dignity, often descending to the theatre to compete with gladiators, and doing other vile things, little worthy of the imperial majesty, he fell into contempt with the soldiers, and being hated by one party and despised by the other, he was conspired against and killed.
Despised and Hated 1 6 1
It remains to discuss the character of Maxi- minus. He was a very warUke man, and the armies, being disgusted with the effeminacy of Alexander, of whom I have akeady spoken, killed him and elected Maximinus to the throne. This he did not possess for long, for two things made him hated and despised; the one, his having kept sheep in Thrace, which brought him into contempt (it being well known to all, and considered a great indignity by every one), and the other, his having at the accession to his dominions deferred going to Rome and taking possession of the imperial seat; he had also gained a reputation for the utmost ferocity by having, through his prefects in Rome and else- where in the empire, practised many cruelties, so that the whole world was moved to anger at the meanness of his birth and to fear at his bar- barity. First Africa rebelled, then the Senate with all the people of Rome, and all Italy con-' spired against him, to which may be added his own army : this latter, besieging Aquileia and meeting with difficulties in taking it, were disgusted with his cruelties, and fearing him less when they found so many against him, murdered him.
I do not wish to discuss HeHogabalus, Mac- rinus, or Juhan, who, being thoroughly contemp- tible, were quickly wiped out; but I will bring this discourse to a conclusion by saying that
1 62 The Prince
princes in our times have this difficulty of giving inordinate satisfaction to their soldiers in a far less degree, because, notwithstanding one has to give them some indulgence, that is soon done; none of these princes have armies that are veterans in the governance and administration of provinces, as were the armies of the Roman Empire ; and whereas it was then more necessary to give satisfaction to the soldiers than to the people, it is now more necessary to all princes, except the Turk and the Soldan, to satisfy the people rather than the soldiers, because the people are the more powerful.
From the above I have excepted the Turk, who always keeps round him twelve thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry on which depend the security and strength of the king- dom, and it is necessary that, putting aside every consideration for the people, he should keep them his friends. The kingdom of the Soldan is similar ; being entirely in the hands of soldiers, it foUows again that, without regard to the people, he must keep them his friends. But you must note that the state of the Soldan is unUke all other principalities, for the reason that it is like the Christian pontificate, which cannot be called either an hereditary or a newly formed principahty ; because the sons of the old prince are not the heirs, but he who is elected to that position by those who have authority,
Despised and Hated 163
and the sons remain only noblemen. And this being an ancient custom, it cannot be called a new principaUty, because there are none of those difficulties in it that are met with in new ones; for although the prince is new, the consti- tution of the state is old, and it is framed so as to receive him as if he were its hereditary lord.
But returning to the subject of our discourse, I say that whoever will consider it will acknow- ledge that either hatred or contempt has been fatal to the above-named emperors, and it will be recognised also how it happened that, a number of them acting in one way and a number in another, only one in each way came to a happy end and the rest to unhappy ones. Because it would have been useless and dangerous for Pertinax and Alexander, being new princes, to imitate Marcus, who was heir to the principality : and hkewise it would have been utterly de- structive to Caracalla, Commodus, and Maxi- minus to have imitated Severus, they not having sufficient valour to enable them to tread in his footsteps. Therefore a prince, new to the principality, cannot imitate the actions of Marcus, nor, again, is it necessary to follow those of Severus, but he ought to take from Severus those parts which are necessary to found his state, and from Marcus those which are proper and glorious to keep a state that may already be stable and firm.
TWENTIETH CHAPTER
ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY THINGS TO WHICH
PRINCES OFTEN RESORT, ADVANTAGEOUS
OR HURTFUL?
T\VENTIETH CHAPTER
ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES OFTEN RESORT, ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL?
I, Some princes, so as to hold securely the state, have disarmed their subjects; others have kept their subject towns distracted by factions; others have fostered enmities against them- selves; others have laid themselves out to gain over those whom they distrusted in the begin- ning of their governments; some have built fortresses ; some have overthrown and destroyed them. And although one cannot give a final judgment on all of these things unless one pos- sesses the particulars of those states in which a decision has to be made, nevertheless I will speak as comprehensively as the matter of itself will admit.
2. There never was a new prince who has dis- armed his subjects; rather when he has found them disarmed he has always armed them, be- cause, by arming them, those arms become yours, those men who were distrusted become
faithful, and those who were faithful are kept G^so 167
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so, and your subjects become your adherents. And whereas all subjects cannot be armed, yet when those whom you do arm are benefited, the others can be handled more freely, and this difference in their treatment, which they quite understand, makes the former your dependents, and the latter, considering it to be necessary that those who have the most danger and ser- vice should have the most reward, excuse you. But when you disarm them, you at once offend them by showing that you distrust them, either for cowardice or for want of loyalty, and either of these opinions breeds hatred against you. And because you cannot remain unarmed, it follows that you turn to mercenaries, which are of the character already shown; even if they should be good they would not be sufficient to defend you against powerful enemies and dis- trusted subjects. Therefore, as I have said, a new prince in a new principahty has always dis- tributed arms. Histories are full of examples. But when a prince acquires a new state, which he adds as a province to his old one, then it is necessary to disarm the men of that state, except those who have been his adherents in acquiring it; and these again, with time and op- portunity, should be rendered soft and effemin- ate; and matters should be managed in such a way that all the armed men in the state shall be your own soldiers who in your old state were living near you.
Arc Fortresses Advantageous ? 169
3. Our forefathers, and those who were reckoned wise, were accustomed to say that it was necessary to hold Pistoia by factions and Pisa by fortresses; and with this idea they fostered quarrels in some of their tributary towns so as to keep possession of them the more easily. This may have been well enough in those times when Italy was in a way balanced, but I do not believe that it can be accepted as a precept for to-day, because I do not beUeve that factions can ever be of use; rather it is certain that when the enemy comes upon you in divided cities you are quickly lost, because the weakest party will always assist the outside forces and the other will not be able to resist. The Vene- tians, moved, as I believe, by the above reasons, fostered the Guelph and Ghibelline factions in their tributary cities; and although they never allowed them to come to bloodshed, yet they nursed these disputes amongst them, so that the citizens, distracted by their differences, should not unite against them. Which, as we saw, did not afterwards turn out as expected, because, after the rout at Vaila, one party at once took courage and seized the state. Such methods argue, therefore, weakness in the prince, because these factions will never be permitted in a vigorous principality; such methods for enabling one the more easily to manage sub- jects are only useful in times of peace, but if war comes this policy proves fallacious.
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4. Without doubt princes become great when they overcome the difficulties and obstacles by which they are confronted, ajid therefore fortune, especially when she desires to make a new prince great, who has a greater necessity to earn re- nown than an hereditary one, causes enemies to arise and form designs against him, in order that he may have the opportunity of overcom- ing them, and by them to mount higher, as by a ladder which his enemies have raised. For this reason many consider that a wise prince, when he has the opportunity, ought with craft to foster some animosity against himself, so that, having crushed it, his renown may rise higher.
5. Princes, especially new ones, have found more fidehty and assistance in those men who in the beginning of their rule were distrusted than among those who in the beginning were trusted. Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, ruled his state more by those who had been dis- trusted than by others. But on this question one cannot speak generally, for it varies so much with the individual; I will only say this, that those men who at the commencement of a princedom have been hostile, if they are of a description to need assistance to support them- selves, can always be gained over with the greatest ease, and they will be tightly held to serve the prince with fidelity, inasmuch as they know it to be very necessary for them to cancel
Arc Fortresses Advantageous ? 171
by deeds the bad impression which he had formed of them; and thus the prince always ex- tracts more profit from them than from those who, serving him in too much security, may neglect his affairs. And since the matter de- mands it, I must not fail to warn a prince, who by means of secret favours has acquired a new state, that he must well consider the reasons which induced those to favour him who did so; and if it be not a natural affection towards him, but only discontent with theit government, then he will only keep them friendly with great trouble and difiiculty, for it will be impossible to satisfy them. And weighing well the reasons for this in those examples which can be taken from ancient and modem affairs, we shall find that it is easier for the prince to make friends of those men who were contented under the former government, and are therefore his enemies, than of those who, being discontented with it, were favourable to him and encouraged him to seize it.
6. It has been a custom with princes, in order to hold their states more securely, to build for- tresses that may serve as a bridle and bit to those who might design to work against them, and as a place of refuge from a first attack. I praise this system because it has been made use of formerly. Notwithstanding that, Messer Nicolo Vitelli in our times has been seen to demohsh
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two fortresses in Citta di Castello so that he might keep that state ; Guido Ubaldo, Duke of Urbino, on returning to his dominion, whence he had been driven by Cesare Borgia, rased to the foundations all the fortresses in that pro- vince, and considered that without them it would be more difficult to lose it ; the Benti- vogli returning to Bologna came to a similar decision. Fortresses, therefore, are useful or not according to circumstances; if they do you good in one way they injure you in another. And this question can be reasoned thus: the prince who has more to fear from the people than from foreigners ought to build fortresses, but he who has more to fear from foreigners than from the people ought to leave them alone. The castle of Milan, built by Francesco Sforza, has made, and will make, more trouble for the house of Sforza than any other disorder in the state. For this reason the best possible fortress is — not to be hated by the people, because, although you may hold the fortresses, yet they wiU not save you if the people hate you, for there will never be wanting foreigners to assist a people who have taken arms against you. It has not been seen in our times that such for- tresses have been of use to any prince, unless to the Countess of Forli, when the Count Giro- lamo, her consort, was killed ; for by that means she was able to withstand the popular attack
Arc Fortresses Advantageous ? 173
and wait for assistance from Milan, and thus re- cover her state; and the posture of affairs was such at that time that the foreigners could not assist the people. But fortresses were of little value to her afterwards when Cesare Borgia at- tacked her, and when the people, her enemy, were allied with foreigners. Therefore, it would have been safer for her, both then and before, not to have been hated by the people than to have had the fortresses. All these things considered then, I shall praise him who builds fortresses as well as him who does not, and I shall blame who- ever, trusting in them, cares little about being hated by the people.
TWENTY-FIRST CHAPTER
HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN
i=Q 280
TWENTY-FIRST CHAPTER
HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN
Nothing makes a prince so much esteemed as great enterprises and setting a fine example. We have in our time Ferdinand of Aragon, the present King of Spain. He can aknost be called a new prince, because he has risen, by fame and glory, from being an insignificant king to be the foremost king in Christendom; and if you will consider his deeds you will find them aU great and some of them extraordinary. In the be- ginning of his reign he attacked Granada, and this enterprise was the foundation of his dominions. He did this quietly at first and without any fear of hindrance, for he held the minds of the barons of Castille occupied in thinking of the war and not anticipating any innovations; thus they did not perceive that by these means he was acquiring power and authority over them. He was able with the money of the Church and of the people to sus- tain his armies, and by that long war to lay the foundation for the military skiU which has since distinguished him. Further, always using
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religion as a plea, so as to undertake greater schemes, he devoted himself with a pious cruelty to driving out and clearing his kingdom of the Moors; nor could there be a more admirable example, nor one more rare. Under this same cloak he assailed Africa, he came down on Italy, he has finally attacked France; and thus his achievements and designs have always been great, and have kept the minds of his people in suspense and admiration and occupied with the issue of them. And his actions have arisen in such a way, one out of the other, that men have never been given time to work steadily against him.
Again, it much assists a prince to set unusual examples in internal affairs, similar to those which are related of Messer Bemabo da Milano, who, when he had the opportunity, by any one in civil life doing some extraordinary thing, either good or bad, would take some method of rewarding or punishing him, which would be much spoken about. And a prince ought, above all things, always to endeavour in every action to gain for himself the reputation of being a great and remarkable man.
A prince is also respected when he is either a true friend or a downright enemy, that is to say, when, without any reservation, he declares him- self in favour of one party against the other; which course will always be more advantageous
To Gain Renown 179
than standing neutral; because if two of your powerful neighbours come to blows, they are of such a character that, if one of them conquers, you have either to fear him or not. In either case it will always be more advantageous for you to declare yourself and to make war strenu- ously; because, in the first case, if you do not declare yourself, you will invariably fall a prey to the conqueror, to the pleasure and satisfac- tion of him who has been conquered, and you will have no reasons to offer, nor anything to protect or to shelter you. Because he who con- quers does not want doubtful friends who will not aid him in the time of trial ; and he who loses will not harbour you because you did not will- ingly, sword in hand, court his fate.
Antiochus went into Greece, being sent for by the iEtolians to drive out the Romans. He sent envoys to the Acheans, who were friends of the Romans, exhorting them to remain neutral; and on the other hand the Romans urged them to take up arms. This question came to be dis- cussed in the council of the Acheans, where the legate of Antiochus urged them to stand neutral. To this the Roman legate answered: " As for that which has been said, that it is better and more advantageous for your state not to inter- fere in our wax, nothing can be more erroneous; because by not interfering you will be left, with- out favour or consideration, the guerdon of the
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conqueror." Thus it will always happen that he who is not your friend will demand your neutrality, whilst he who is your friend will en- treat you to declare yourself with arms. And irresolute princes, to avoid present dangers, generally follow the neutral path, and are gener- ally ruined. But when a prince declares him- self gallantly in favour of one side, if the party with whom he aUies himself conquers, although the victor may be powerful and may have him at his mercy, yet he is indebted to him, and there is estabhshed a bond of amity; and men are never so shameless as to become a monument of ingratitude by oppressing you. Victories after aU are never so complete that the victor must not show some regard, especially to justice. But if he with whom you aUy yourself loses, you may be sheltered by him, and whilst he is able he may aid you, and you become companions in a fortune that may rise again.
In the second case, when those who fight are of such a character that you have no anxiety as to who may conquer, so much the more is it greater prudence to be aUied, because you assist at the destruction of one by the aid of another who, if he had been wise, would have saved him ; and conquering, as it is impossible that he should not with your assistance, he remains at your discretion. And here it is to be noted that a prince ought to take care never to make an alii-
To Gain Renown 1 8 i
ance with one more powerful than himself for the purpose of attacking others, unless necessity compels him, as is said above; because if he conquers you are at his discretion, and princes ought to avoid as much as possible being at the discretion of any one. The Venetians joined with France against the Duke of Milan, and this alliance, which caused their ruin, could have been avoided. But when it cannot be avoided, as happened to the Florentines when the Pope and Spain sent armies to attack Lombardy, then in such a case, for the above reasons, the prince ought to favour one of the parties.
Never let any Government imagine that it can choose perfectly safe courses ; rather let it expect to have to take very doubtful ones, because it is found in ordinary affairs that one never seeks to avoid one trouble without run- ning into another; but prudence consists in knowing how to distinguish the character of troubles, and for choice to take the lesser evil.
A prince ought also to show himself a patron of abihty, and to honour the proficient in every art. At the same time he should encourage his citizens to practise their callings peaceably, both in commerce and agriculture, and in every other following, so that the one should not be deterred from improving his possessions for fear lest they be taken away from him or another from open- ing up trade for fear of taxes; but the prince
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ought to offer rewards to whoever wishes to do these things and designs in any way to honour his city or state.
Further, he ought to entertain the people with festivals and spectacles at convenient seasons of the year; and as every city is divided into guilds or into societies/ he ought to hold such bodies in esteem, and associate with them some- times, and show himself an example of courtesy and hberality; nevertheless, always maintain- ing the majesty of his rank, for this he must never consent to abate in anything.
» See Noto.
TWENTY-SECOND CHAPTER
CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES
TWENTY-SECOND CHAPTER
CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES
The choice of servants is of no little importance to a prince, and they are good or not according to the discrimination of the prince. And the first opinion which one forms of a prince, and of his understanding, is by observing the men he has aromid him; and when they are capable and faithful he may always be considered wise, be- cause he has known how to recognise the capable and to keep them faithful. But when they are otherwise one cannot form a good opinion of him, for the prime error which he made was in choosing them.
There were none who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as the servant of Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, who would not consider Pan- dolfo to be a very clever man in having Venafro for his servant. Because there are three classes of intellects : one which comprehends by itself ; another which appreciates what others compre- hend; and a third which neither comprehends
by itself nor by the showing of others ; the first
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is the most excellent, the second is good, the third is useless. Therefore, it foUows neces- sarily that, if Pandolfo was not in the first rank, he was in the second, for whenever one has judg- ment to know good or bad when it is said and done, although he himself may not have the initiative, yet he can recognise the good and the bad in his servant, and the one he can praise and the other correct; thus the servant cannot hope to deceive him, and is kept honest.
But to enable a prince to form an opinion of his servant there is one test which never fails; when you see the servant thinking more of his own interests than of yours, and seeking inwardly his own profit in everything, such a man wiH never make a good servant, nor wiU you ever be able to trust him ; because he who has the state of another in his hands ought never to think of him- self, but always of his prince, and never pay any attention to matters in which the prince is not concerned.
On the other hand, to keep his servant honest the prince ought to study him, honouring him, enriching him, doing him kindnesses, sharing with him the honours and cares; and at the same time let him see that he cannot stand alone, so that many honours may not make him desire more, many riches make him wish for more, and that many cares may make hira dread changes. When, therefore, servants, and
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princes towards servants, are thus disposed, they can trust each other, but when it is other- wise, the end will always be disastrous for either one or the other.
TWENTY-THIRD CHAPTER
HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED
i
TWENTY-THIRD CHAPTER
HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED
I DO not wish to leave out an important branch of this subject, for it is a danger from which princes are with difficulty preserved, unless they are very careful and discriminating. It is that of flatterers, of whom courts are fuU, because men are so self-complacent in their own affairs, and in a way so deceived in them, that they are preserved with difficulty from this pest, and if they wish to defend themselves they run the danger of falling into contempt. Because there is no other way of guarding oneself from flat- terers except letting men understand that to teU you the truth does not offend you; but when every one may tell you the truth, respect for you abates.
Therefore a wise prince ought to hold a third course by choosing the wise men in his state, and giving to them only the hberty of speaking the truth to him, and then only of those things of which he inquires, and of none others; but he ought to question them upon everything, and listen to their opinions, and afterwards form his own conclusions. With these councillors,
separately and collectively, he ought to cany
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himself in such a way that each of them should know that, the more freely he shall speak, the more he shall be preferred; outside of these, he should listen to no one, pursue the thing re- solved on, and be steadfast in his resolutions. He who does otherwise is either overthrown by flatterers, or is so often changed by varying opinions that he falls into contempt.
I wish on this subject to adduce a modern example. Fra Luca, the man of affairs to Maximilian, the present emperor, speaking of his majesty, said: He consulted with no one, yet never got his own way in anything. This arose because of his following a practice the opposite to the above; for the emperor is a secretive man — he does not communicate his designs to any one, nor does he receive opinions on them. But as in carrying them into effect they become revealed and known, they are at once obstructed bv those men whom he has around him, and he, being pliant, is diverted from them. Hence it follows that those things he does one day he undoes the next, and no one ever understands what he wishes or intends to do, and no one can rely on his resolutions.
A prince, therefore, ought always to take counsel, but only when he wishes and not when others wish; he ought rather to discourage every one from offering advice unless he asks it ; but, however, he ought to be a constant inquirer,
How Flatterers Should be Avoided 193
and afterwards a patient listener concerning the things of which he inquired; also, on learning that any one, on any consideration, has not told him the truth, he should let his anger be felt.
And if there are some who think that a prince who conveys an impression of his wisdom is not so through his own ability, but through the good advisers that he has around him, beyond doubt they are deceived, because this is an axiom which never fails: that a prince who is not wise himself will never take good advice, unless by chance he lias yielded his affairs en- tirely to one person who happens to be a very prudent man. In this case indeed he may be well governed, but it would not be for long, be- cause such a governor would in a short time take away his state from him.
But if a prince who is not experienced should take counsel from more than one he will never get united counsels, nor wiU he know how to unite them. Each of the counsellors will think of his own interests, and the prince will not know how to control them or to see through them. And they are not to be found otherwise, because men wiU always prove untrue to you unless they are kept honest by constraint. Therefore it must be inferred that good counsels, whencesoever they come, are born of the wisdom of the prince, and not the wisdom of the prince from good counsels.
TWENTY-FOURTH CHAPTER
WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR
STATES
TWENTY-FOURTH CHAPTER
WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR
STATES
The previous suggestions, carefully observed, will enable a new prince to appear well estab- lished, and render him at once more secure and fixed in the state than if he had been long seated there. For the actions of a new prince are more narrowly observed than those of an hereditary one, and when they are seen to be able they gain more men and bind far tighter than ancient blood; because men are attracted more by the present than by the past, and when they find the present good they enjoy it and seek no further ; they will also make the utmost defence for a prince if he fails them not in other things. Thus it will be a double glory to him to have estabUshed a new principaUty, and adorned and strengthened it with good laws, good arms, good allies, and with a good example ; so will it be a double disgrace to him who, bom a prince, shall lose his state by want of wisdom.
And if those seigniors are considered who have lost their states in Italy in our times, such
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as the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and others, there will be found in them, firstly, one common defect in regard to arms from the causes which ha-ve been discussed at length; in the next place, some one of them will be seen, either to have had the people hostile, or if he has had the people friendly, he has not known how to secure the nobles. In the absence of these defects states that have power enough to keep an army in the field cannot be lost.
Philip of Macedon, not the father of Alex- ander the Great, but he who was conquered by Titus Quintius, had not much territory com- pared to the greatness of the Romans and of Greece who attacked him, yet being a warlike man who knew how to attract the people and secure the nobles, he sustained the war against his enemies for many years, and if in the end he lost the dominion of some cities, nevertheless he retained the kingdom.
Therefore, do not let our princes accuse for- tune for the loss of their principalities after so many years' possession, but rather their own sloth, because in quiet times they never thought there could be a change (it is a common defect in man not to make any provision in the calm against the tempest), and when afterwards the bad times came they thought of flight and not of defending themselves, and they hoped that the people, disgusted with the insolence of the
Princes of Italy 199
conquerors, would recall them. This course, when others fail, may be good, but it is very bad to have neglected all other expedients for that, since you would never wish to fall because you trusted to be able to find some one later on to restore you. This again either does not happen, or, if it does, it will not be for your security, because that deliverance is of no avail which does not depend upon yourself; those only are rehable, certain, and durable that depend on yourself and your valour.
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TWENTY-FIFTH CHAPTER
WHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS. AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER
TWENTY-FIFTH CHAPTER
V,TIAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS, AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER
It is not unknown to me how many men have had, and stiU have, the opinion that the affairs of the world are in such wise governed by for- tune and by God that men with their wisdom cannot direct them and that no one can even help them ; and because of this they would have us beheve that it is not necessary to labour much in affairs, but to let chance govern them. This opinion has been more credited in our times because of the great changes in affairs which have been seen, and may still be seen, every day, beyond all human conjecture. Sometimes pondering over this, I am in some degree in- clined to their opinion. Nevertheless, not to extinguish our free -wiU, I hold it to be true that fortune is the arbiter of one half of our actions, but that she still leaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps a Httle less.
I compare her to one of those raging rivers, which when in flood overflows the plains, sweep- ing away trees and buildings, bearing away the
soil from place to place; everything flies before
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it, all yield to its violence, without being able in any way to withstand it; and yet, though its nature be such, it does not follow therefore that men, when the weather becomes fair, shall not make provision, both with defences and barriers, in such a manner that, rising again, the waters may pass away by canal, and their force be neither so unrestrained nor so dangerous. So it happens with fortune, who shows her power where valour has not prepared to resist her, and thither she turns her forces where she knows that barriers and defences have not been raised to constrain her.
And if you will consider Italy, which is the seat of these changes, and which has given to them their impulse, you will see it to be an open country without barriers and without any de- fence. For if it had been defended by proper valour, as are Germany, Spain, and France, either this invasion would not have made the great changes it has made or it would not have come at all. And this I consider enough to say concerning resistance to fortune in general.
But confining myself more to the particular, I say that a prince may be seen happy to-day and ruined to-morrow without having shown any change of disposition or character. This, I beheve, arises firstly from causes that have already been discussed at length, namely, that the prince who rehes entirely upon fortune is
What Fortune Can Effect 205
lost when it changes, I believe also that he will be successful who directs his actions according to the spirit of the times, and that he whose actions do not accord with the times will not be successful. Because men are seen, in affairs that lead to the end which every man has before him, namely, glory and riches, to get there by various methods; one with caution, another with haste; one by force, another by skill; one by patience, another by its opposite; and each one succeeds in reaching the goal by a different method. One can also see of two cautious men the one attain his end, the other